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Abstract
This report is the final report resulting from the deliberations of the NATO Research Task
Group on the Validation, Verification and Certification of Embedded Systems (IST-027 /
RTG-009). The report discusses the important role of embedded systems in both the civil and
military contexts. Given the importance, the validation, verification and certification (VV&C) of
such systems are of increasing concern. The report discusses the current landscape of VV&C,
expected evolution, and also identifies standards of note. The report concludes with various
conclusions and recommendations drawn from the task groups deliberations.
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1 Introduction
This final report is the result of deliberations periodically held over a three-year period of the
NATO Research Task Group on the Validation, Verification and Certification of Embedded
Systems (IST-027/RTG-009).
1.1 Background
The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Research Task Group (RTG), provides the historical
background for the group as follows:
In September 1996, the Flight Vehicle Integration Panel made a proposal to form a Working
Group that was approved by RTB in March 1997 under the same title. This group never started
due to some difficulties to meet the experts from the appropriate organisms. In addition, RTO
was restructured within the same period. The new SCI Panel received the legacy of this activity
and decided at its 1998 Fall Business Meeting to ask IST Panel if this activity could be
transferred under the IST panel auspices. The idea for a Task Group has been discussed both in
IST Panel meetings and via e-mail. In a discussion at its autumn 1999 meeting, a sufficient
number of Panel Members supported the formation of a Task Group on the subject for more
detailed and substantial work. Embedded systems are ubiquitous in military systems as well as
in commercial products used in military applications. From tactical radios to range finders to
avionics control units, the Battlespace is filled with digital devices that rely on embedded
software for proper operation and functionality. For life-critical and mission-critical systems,
extensive testing is required; yet the size and scope of embedded software in todays products
precludes exhaustive testing.
The ToR continues by justifying the RTG to NATO as follows:
Some testing techniques, such as modified condition/decision coverage (MC/DC), have been
adopted by government agencies as required methods. Yet there is no body of knowledge that
characterizes the types of faults typically found by the various methods and which types of
faults might remain undetected. Furthermore, performance testing and stress/load testing are
oftentimes overlooked until the product is fielded. Thus, verification and validation are critical
efforts for embedded systems. Furthermore, the recent Y2K exercises demonstrated the
difficulties many vendors experienced in certifying software. Those Y2K issues related strictly
to date and time and yet were quite costly. Expanding the scope to include proper functionality
under planned and unplanned usage is important, especially for safety-critical systems; cost-
effective and timely methods are needed for certification.
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And, finally, the ToR states that the objective of the RTG:
 is to review the techniques currently used in the software industry to product high quality
products; an appropriate number of methods and software life-cycle metrics for systems of relevant
complexity should also be examined, particularly those which are supported by fully operational
environments. At the conclusion of this activity, the Task Group should deliver a report addressing
the following topics:
• Assessment of current technical capabilities and relevance of these techniques and methods to
embedded military systems
• Assessment of relative strengths and limitations of these methods
• Assessment of current research trends in testing, formal methods, and requirements
traceability
• Specific recommendations for military application of these techniques
• Recommendation for future NATO IST efforts, if relevant, such as Symposium or
Workshop.
This report will specifically address each of the above topics in the final section (conclusions
and recommendations).
1.2 Meetings
Over the term of the RTG (and the predecessor Exploratory Task Group) nine meetings were
held as follows:
- Istanbul, Turkey (October 2000; under the auspices of an Exploratory Task Group);
- Paris, France  (March 2001; initial meeting of the RTG);
- Quebec City, Canada (May 2001);
- Warsaw, Poland (October 2001);
- London, United Kingdom (January 2002 [unofficial meeting]);
- Estoril, Portugal (May 2002);
- Cannes, France (October 2002);
- Barcelona, Spain (February 2003);
- Prague, The Czech Republic (October 2003).
These meetings, mostly in conjunction with IST Panel Symposia, provided a means for the key
members of the Research Task Group to discuss, in detail, various technical aspects of the
VV&C of Embedded Systems. During the Estoril meeting, the IST Panel requested that the
RTG consider activities pertaining to NATOs combating terrorism mandate. This resulted in
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four recommendations being made to the IST Panel of which one was accepted as a follow on
activity. The Cannes meeting was held in conjunction with a meeting of the Open Group and, in
particular, one of their working groups on Real-time Embedded Systems. This provided an
opportunity for interaction between two otherwise mostly independent groups and allowed for
some cross-fertilization of ideas.1 The Barcelona and Prague meetings focused on authoring
various aspects of this report and to specifically discuss the conclusions and recommendations.
1.3 Report
This report consists of the following sections:
Introduction Terms of reference for the RTG.
Embedded Systems
Author: Dan Craigen
General discussion; definitions of embedded
systems; technology and market trends.
Verification and Validation: Current and
Best Practice
Author: Natalia Juristo
Definitions of validation, verification, error, fault,
and failure; evaluation versus prevention; quality
attributes; overview of fault detection techniques.
Verification and Validation: Evolution
and Enhancement
Author: Jacques Cazin
Avionics systems; General pointers for software
partitioning, model checking, static analysis, test
case generation from high level specifications,
man machine interface and safety analysis.
Standards
Author: Ernst Kesseler
Brief introductions to various standards:
DO178B/ED12B, DO-278/ED109, IEC61508, AC
120-76, DRD 920, IEC 60880-2, FDA 1252, UK
SW01, Common Criteria.
Certification
Authors: Robin Bloomfield and Jeff Voas
Discussion on the certification of embedded
systems; different kinds of certification;
assessment of certification and relevance to
NATO requirements; conclusions.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Editor: Dan Craigen
Described within the context specified by the
Terms of Reference, including various
assessments and recommendations.
                                                     
1 Two members of the task group, Bloomfield and Craigen also attended the February 2003 Open Group meeting in Burlingame,
California.
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Appendices Terms of reference; TAP; Programme of Work;
Participants; Combat terrorism recommendations;
software certification agencies and services
offered; mapping techniques to properties and
attributes.
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2 Embedded Systems
Embedded Systems are ubiquitous. They appear in cell phones, microwave ovens, refrigerators,
automobiles and a veritable array of consumer products. Some of these embedded systems have
potentially safety or security critical consequences. Embedded systems exist in contexts where
failure can be profound. Consider fly by wire, chemical factories, nuclear power plants and even
offshore oil wells. Though embedded systems are already ubiquitous, the adoption trajectory of
the technology continues unabated. Similar observations exist within the military realm. From
smart sensors, software fuses to the evolution of the battle space to being network centric. New
projects are almost unfathomable in their scope and extensive usage of embedded systems. For
example, the proposed U.S. DDX submarine is effectively a floating software system. It is
estimated that the submarine will have 30,000,000,000 lines of code, will make use of 142
programming languages and, obviously, have a huge amount of hardware. How does one even
start thinking about how to assess such a system? How do we manage such complexity? Is the
technology even there?
Embedded systems are expensive. According to Jack Ganssle,2 firmware, the software
associated with embedded systems, normally cost between US$15-30 per line (from project
commencement through to shipping). In the defense realm, with its substantial documentation
requirements, costs can range up to US$100 or more. For highly critical applications, of which
Ganssle mentions the space shuttle, the cost per line of code approximates US$1,000. Hence,
                                                     
2 See http://www.embedded.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=17500630, Embedded Systems Programming.
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even for a small 5,000-line application, one can easily be talking about projects in the hundreds
of thousands of dollars.
The market size for embedded systems is huge. Some estimates place the size of the market at
$31,000,000,000, while the general purpose computing market is around $46,500,000,000. The
micro-controller market is around $5,000,000,000 with an annual growth rate of around 18%.
The growth rate for general-purpose processes is only 10%. With these trends, the embedded
systems market will soon be larger than that for general purpose computing. The desktop market
is stagnating; the embedded systems market is flourishing.
NATO strategies are continually evolving, but depend substantially on the use of high
technology to provide full spectrum dominance. Obviously, given the multinational and
interagency components of NATO, and the overall complexity of the battle space, innovation is
a vital component of the joint force of the future.3
But for all the complexity of defence systems and the ubiquity within the defence milieu, it is a
diminishing presence in comparison to the explosive growth of embedded systems in the non-
defence realm. A consequence of this diminishing presence means that organizations such as
NATO and the U.S. Department of Defense have less impact on evolutionary trends than they
have had in the past. The purpose of this report is not to answer the above questions, but to
provide the reader with an introduction, overview and assessment of the current and future
landscape for the verification, validation and certification of embedded systems. Given the
criticality of such systems, how to assess such systems becomes a major concern. Hence, the
subject matter of this report.
2.1 What are Embedded Systems?
What are embedded systems? There are numerous definitions, of which a few examples follow:
From http://www.netrino.com/Publications/Glossary/E.html, we have
A combination of computer hardware and software, and perhaps additional mechanical
or other parts, designed to perform a dedicated function. In some cases, embedded
systems are part of a larger system or product, as in the case of an antilock braking
system in a car.
                                                     
3 See Joint Vision 2020 (www.dtic.mil/jv2020/jv2020a.pdf) for a sense of how military strategies are expected to evolve.
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In support of the above definition, the following examples of embedded systems were
provided: Microwave ovens, cell phones, calculators, digital watches, VCRs, cruise
missiles, GPS receivers, heart monitors, laser printers, radar guns, engine controllers,
digital cameras, traffic lights, remote controls, bread machines, fax machines, pagers,
cash registers, treadmills, gas pumps, credit/debit card readers, thermostats,
pacemakers, blood gas monitors, grain analyzers
From www.y2k.gov/got.html, we have
 a device that contains computer logic on a chip inside it not independently
programmable by the user. Such equipment is electrical or battery powered. The chip
controls one or more functions of the equipment, such as remembering how long it has
been since the device last received maintenance.
From http://www.embedded.com/wriguide/index.html, we have
An embedded system is a combination of computer hardware and software, and perhaps
additional mechanical or other parts, designed to perform a dedicated function. In some
cases, embedded systems are part of larger systems or products, as is the case of an anti-
lock braking system.
From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embedded_system, we have
An embedded system is a special-purpose computer system built into a larger device.
An embedded system is typically required to meet very different requirements than a
general-purpose personal computer.
Two major areas of differences are cost and power consumption. Since many embedded
systems are produced in the tens of thousands to millions of units range, reducing cost
is a major concern. Embedded systems often use a (relatively) slow processor and small
memory size to minimize costs.
The slowness is not just clock speed. The whole architecture of the computer is often
intentionally simplified to lower costs. For example, embedded systems often use
peripherals controlled by synchronous serial interfaces, which are ten to hundreds of
times slower than comparable peripherals used in PCs.
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Programs on an embedded system often must run with real-time constraints. Usually
there is no disk drive, operating system, keyboard or screen.
Sifakis and Bouyssounouse in a paper4 describing their vision for R&D in embedded systems
define embedded systems as:
Embedded Systems are components integrating software and hardware jointly and
specifically designed to provide given functionalities. These components may be used
in many different types of applications, including transport (avionics, space,
automotive, trains), electrical and electronic appliances (cameras, toys, television,
washers, dryers, audio systems, cellular phones), power distribution, factory automation
systems, etc.
They go on to note that there is a major trend in information science and technology of the
proliferation of embedded systems. It is observed that embedded systems are crucial to, for
example, the avionics, automotive, space, consumer electronics, smart card, telecom, and energy
distribution sectors. Characteristics of note for embedded systems are criticality, reactivity and
autonomy. Criticality depends upon the consequences of failure. For example, a cell phone
failing in Amsterdam may not have severe consequences; however, if your car breaks down in
Lapland, the inability to communicate could result in dire consequences. Sifakis and
Bouyssounouse note that deviation from the norm can have an impact upon safety, security,
mission completion, and on business. In the latter case, they note that business critical systems
include services deployed on an embedded infrastructure such as cell phones, power
distribution, traffic management, and distributed entertainment. Reactivity pertains to the
characteristic that embedded systems must react within the parameters of certain real-time
constraints. These real-time constraints can be hard or soft. A hard real-time constraint implies
that the expected functionality must be completed within a certain timeframe. Autonomy
pertains to an embedded system performing its duties without human input for extended periods
of time. Robotic landers on Mars are, by nature, autonomous.
2.2 Trends
In the first part of a Dependable Systems Roadmap,5 arising from the Accompanying Measure
on System Dependability (AMSD) there is an indication of likely trends for embedded systems:
                                                     
4 See http://www.softwareresearch.net/site/other/EmSys03/docs/Sifakis.Embedded-EmSys.pdf.
5 Full report available from http://www.am-
sd.org/default/page.gx?_app.page=entity.html&_app.action=entity&_entity.object=KM------
000000000000067A&_entity.name=DES_Roadmap-Final_Version.
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Considering the economies of scale of the enabling semiconductor technologies, the
market of safety-critical automotive systems has been identified as the most important
market for DES6 technology, since the automotive market is the largest and the most
cost-sensitive market (more than 50 million cars are produced annually).   The
envisioned future dominant applications in this growing market (e.g., driveby-wire
systems that enhance vehicle stability and thus reduce the number of accidents)...  From
the dependability technology point-of-view, the leading market is the aerospace market.
Although small in comparison to the coming automotive market for dependable
embedded systems, it contains mature dependability technology that will be scrutinized
in order to determine those aspects that can be transferred to mass-market applications.
(Space applications like GALILEO are a unifying link between aerospace and other
critical applications like navigation services for air and ground transportation).
Others have estimated that the market for embedded systems is 100 times the size of that for the
desktop market. It is of little surprise that the Information Technology giants (e.g., Microsoft)
are moving into the market, especially with the desktop market being now viewed as saturated.
Recently the U.S. National Research Councils Computer Science and Telecommunications
Board empanelled a group of researchers under the title Sufficient Evidence? Building
Certifiably Dependable Systems. The scope7 of the project is described as follows:
This project will convene a mixed group of experts to assess current practices for
developing and evaluating mission-critical software, with an emphasis on dependability
objectives. The committee will address system certification, examining a few different
application domains (e.g., medical devices and aviation systems) and their approaches
to software evaluation and assurance. This should provide some understanding of what
common ground and disparities exist. The discussion will engage members of the
fundamental research community, who have been scarce in this arena. It will consider
approaches to systematically assessing systems' user interfaces. It will examine
potential benefits and costs of improvements in evaluation of dependability as
performance dimensions. It will evaluate the extent to which current tools and
techniques aid in ensuring and evaluating dependability in software and investigate
technology that might support changes in the development and certification process. It
will also use the information amassed to develop a research agenda for dependable
software system development and certification, factoring in earlier High Confidence
                                                     
6 Dependable Embedded Systems.
7 Quoted from http://www7.nationalacademies.org/cstb/project_dependable.html.
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Software and Systems research planning. It will also investigate ideas for improving the
certification processes for dependability-critical software systems.
The output of this group is to be a written report incorporating recommendations, which, we
suspect, will be a useful adjunct to the current report.
The mission of The Open Group8 is
 to drive the creation of Boundaryless Information Flow achieved by:
• Working with customers to capture, understand and address current and emerging
requirements, establish policies, and share best practices;
• Working with suppliers, consortia and standards bodies to develop consensus and
facilitate interoperability, to evolve and integrate specifications and open source
technologies;
• Offering a comprehensive set of services to enhance the operational efficiency of
consortia; and
• Developing and operating the industry's premier certification service and encouraging
procurement of certified products.
Of particular interest to our charter is the Open Group forum on Real-time and Embedded
Systems. According the Open Group website the vision of the form is to grow the marketplace
for standardized real-time and embedded systems, through the deployments of standards and
associated certification programs. The associated goals of the forum are:
• To be the 'single place' for real-time and embedded systems practitioners to come together
for information exchange
• To act as an independent broker to integrate and bring together related Real-Time and
Embedded Systems activities
• To develop a series of White Papers identifying the specific needs of Real-Time and
Embedded Systems
• To identify priorities for standardization
• To develop test and certification programs to enable the proliferation of standardized real-
time and embedded systems.
                                                     
8 Quoted from http://www.opengroup.org/overview/index.htm.
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2.3 Trends: Conferences/Workshops
In this section, we extract discussion topics occurring in a number of embedded systems
conferences and workshops. These topics are suggestive of R&D trends in the space and the
current landscape.
Joe Bergmann9 in his agenda for the February 2004 Real Time and Embedded Systems
workshop listed the following topics:
• Focus on Commercial Real-time Environments
• Requirements for Commercial RT Applications to include Avionics, Telematics and
Pervasive Computing
• Open Architecture WG
• Commonality of various OA Approaches
• DRM Standards Development
• Security for RT WG
• MILS for Web Services
• PP for Commercial RTOS
• Security for SCADA
• Security for Middleware
• RT Profiles and Certification WG
• Develop RT Certification Profile based on US Navy OACE, FCS SoSCOE, US Army OE
• Safety/Mission Critical Applications
• Specification Development for XML Tags for Traceability
• Safety/Mission Critical RT Java WG
• Ratify Business Plan
• Specification Development SC RT Java
• Mission Critical JSR
• Potential New Items
• High Assurance Systems
• Software Assurance Issues
• Quality of Service Software Issues for RT Environments
• Applicability of OOT in Safety Critical Environments
• Database Requirements for RT
• Procurement issues concerning adherence to Open Systems, Open Standards and
Certification
                                                     
9 Agenda lodged at http://www.opengroup.org/rtforum/doc.tpl?CALLER=documents.tpl&gdid=4043.
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The April 2004 Formal Foundations of Embedded Software and Component-Based Software
Architectures (FESCA) Conference10 encouraged submissions on formal techniques that aid
reasoning, analysis and certification of embedded software and component-based software
architectures. The call for papers particularly focused on:
• component interoperability,
• contractually used components,
• interface compliancy (interface-to-interface and interface-to implementation),
• compliancy with synchronization constraints,
• temporal properties including liveness and safety,
• security/access rights, further non-functional properties (reliability, performance,
timeliness),
• formal methods and dependability,
• formal design methodologies and modeling techniques,
• formal methods for embedded real-time software,
• formal methods and pervasive computing.
The call also was interested in tools and techniques pertaining to the area and explicitly noted::
• logic-based approaches using interactive or automated theorem proving (e.g., B, Z, PVS,
Coq),
• concurrency models (e.g., process calculi, refinement calculi, state machines, Petri-nets),
• type theory based reasoning of correctness, component composition frameworks.
In November 2004 the second ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems
(SenSys 2004) is scheduled to occur in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A. According to the call for
papers11 the purpose and scope of the conference is as follows:
SenSys 2004 introduces a high caliber forum for research on systems issues in the
emerging area of embedded, networked sensors. These distributed systems of numerous
smart sensors and actuators will revolutionize a wide array of application areas by
providing an unprecedented density and fidelity of instrumentation. They also present
novel systems challenges because of resource constraints, uncertainty, irregularity, and
scale. SenSys design issues span multiple disciplines, including wireless
communication, networking, operating systems, architecture, low-power circuits,
                                                     
10 See http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/fesca/ for further details.
11 See http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/sensys04/ for further details.
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distributed algorithms, data processing, scheduling, sensors, energy harvesting, and
signal processing. SenSys seeks to provide a cross-disciplinary venue for researchers
addressing these networked sensor system design issues.
Topics of note at SenSys 2004 are:
• Network protocols for sensor networks
• Operating system and middleware for sensor networks
• Applications of distributed sensor networks
• Sensor network testbed measurements and benchmarks
• Distributed database processing in sensor networks
• Distributed algorithms for sensor networks
• Novel sensor node hardware and software platforms
• Sensor network planning and deployment
• Energy management in sensor networks
• Adaptive topology management
• In-network processing and aggregation
• Data storage in sensor networks
• Distributed and collaborative signal processing
• Distributed actuation, control, and coordination
• Localization in time and space
• Distributed calibration in sensor networks
• Simulation and optimization tools
• Security
• Fundamental limits and tradeoffs
• Robustness
• Algorithms for self-configuration, maintenance, stabilization
• Programming and validation methodology
Security of embedded systems is to be discussed in the August 2004 workshop on
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES 2004)12 to be held in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, U.S. As described in the call for papers the focus of the workshop is:
 on all aspects of cryptographic hardware and security in embedded systems. The
workshop will be a forum of new results from the research community as well as from
the industry. Of special interest are contributions that describe new methods for
                                                     
12 See http://islab.oregonstate.edu/ches/start.html for further information.
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efficient hardware implementations and high-speed software for embedded systems,
e.g., smart cards, microprocessors, DSPs, etc. We hope that the workshop will help to
fill the gap between the cryptography research community and the application areas of
cryptography.
The topics of CHES 2004 include but are not limited to:
• Computer architectures for public-key and secret-key cryptosystems
• Efficient algorithms for embedded processors
• Reconfigurable computing in cryptography
• Cryptographic processors and co-processors
• Cryptography in wireless applications (mobile phone, LANs, etc.)
• Security in pay-TV systems
• Smart card attacks and architectures
• Tamper resistance on the chip and board level
• True and pseudo random number generators
• Special-purpose hardware for cryptanalysis
• Embedded security
• Device identification
Another major upcoming (as of February 2004) embedded systems conference is EMSOFT
2004,13 the 4th ACM International Conference on Embedded Software, to be held in Pisa, Italy,
in September 2004. The primary objective of this conference is to advance the science,
engineering, and technology in embedded software development. The conference website notes
the following sample areas of interest:
• System design and integration methodologies
• Programming languages and software engineering
• Operating systems and scheduling
• Hardware/software interfaces and system-level design
• Models of computation and formal methods
• Compilers and execution time analysis
• Networked embedded systems
• Sensor networks and distributed wireless architectures
• Hardware/software co-design and systems-on-chip
                                                     
13 See http://www.emsoft.org/ for further information.
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• Middleware and QoS management
• Communication protocols and fault tolerance
• Applications on embedded control and multimedia
The 10th IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium (RTAS
2004)14 to be held in Toronto, Canada, May 2004 has three special tracks of note and are
described as follows on the conference website:
Real-time Infrastructure and Development: This thrust continues from previous years with
focus on embedded and real-time systems that exhibit significant timing constraints. Papers
should describe significant contributions to the fundamental infrastructure, system support, or
theoretic foundations for real-time computing. Topics include all of those associated with real-
time computing platforms and development tools and techniques, such as real-time resource
management, real-time operating systems, security, real-time Java, middleware, real-time
CORBA, secure real-time systems, support for QoS, novel kernel-level mechanisms, power-
aware real-time systems, real-time software component models, model-based development,
QoS-aware design, real-time system modeling and analysis, formal methods, scheduling, and
performance feedback control.
Real-time control: New this year is an explicit track on the role of control in real-time
computing, and the interaction between computing and control systems. Topics cover the use of
real-time control methods within infrastructures as well as end-user applications, including but
not limited to the interaction of feedback control and scheduling, nonlinear and uncertain real-
time systems, modeling and simulation of performance control, computational models and
languages for control applications, resource-constrained control or resource-aware control,
temporal robustness, robotics, embedded and hybrid systems, and hybrid control.
Embedded Applications: We invite papers on industrial and other real-time and embedded
applications. The focus of this track is on contributions associated with systems that are actually
deployed in commercial industry, military, or other production environments, including
automotive, avionics, telecom, industrial control, aerospace, consumer electronics, and sensors.
Papers in this area include, but are not limited to challenges, requirements, model problems, and
constraints associated with various application domains, use of real-time and embedded
technologies in meeting particular system requirements, performance, scalability, reliability,
security, or other assessments of real-time and embedded technologies for particular application
                                                     
14 See http://www.cs.virginia.edu/rtas04/ for further information.
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domains, mining of architectural and design patterns from applications, and technology
transition lessons learned.
These are only a few of the conferences, workshops and symposia directed towards embedded
systems subjects. The extent of the meetings pertaining to embedded systems is highly
suggestive of the importance and increasing ubiquity of the technology. Many R&D issues
remain, even though deployment of embedded systems continues unabated. The Verification,
Validation and Certification of Embedded Systems is crucial. The next four sections of this
provide an overview and commentary regarding, in order, current and best practice of
verification and validation, possible evolution and enhancement of verification and validation,
standards, and certification of embedded systems. These sections provide the reader with a solid
perspective on the technical landscape for the VV&C of Embedded Systems. We end the report
with our conclusions and recommendations.
3 Verification and Validation: Current and Best Practice
In this section we discuss current and best practices in the verification and validation of
embedded systems.
3.1 Definitions of Validation and Verification
There are numerous definitions of verification and validation. We present two well-known
definitions: An IEEE standard definition and one given by Barry Boehm, an old but very
important definition within the software engineering community. According to IEEE,15
Verification can mean the
• Act of reviewing, inspecting, testing, checking, auditing, or otherwise establishing and
documenting whether items, processes, services or documents conform to specified
requirements.
• Process of determining whether the products of a given phase of the software development
life cycle fulfil the requirements established during the previous phase;
• Formal proof of program correctness.
Validation is defined as the evaluation of software at the end of the software development
process to ensure compliance with the user requirements. Validation is, therefore, end-to-end
verification.
                                                     
15 IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology. ANSI IEEE Std, 1983. IEEE Computer Society.
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According to Boehm:16
• Verification.  Am I building the system right?
• Validation.  Am I building the right system?
In the definition for validation, note that it aims to compare a system with its requirements.
Therefore, it has to do not only with quality attributes, such as functionality and reliability, but
also includes non-functional requirements.
3.2 Definitions of Error, Fault and Failure
A distinction has to be made between terms that have a host of definitions, which can lead to
confusion about their meaning. This refers in particular to the difference between error, fault,
and failure. IEEE17 makes the following difference:
• Error. People make errors when they reason incorrectly to try to solve a problem.
• Fault. An error becomes a fault when it is written (included) in any of the developed
software products.
• Failure. Failures occur when a software system does not behave as desired (does not do
what it should do), which reveals a fault in the software.
The term defect will be generally used to refer to any of these concepts.
3.3 Evaluation vs. Prevention
As conceived by Beizer,18 the actions for producing quality systems can be generically divided
into two groups: preventive and corrective. The main difference between the two is that
preventive actions define a series of activities to be performed a priori, that is, during software
construction, to ensure that the product output is not of poor quality, whereas corrective actions
take place a posteriori, that is, once the software product has been constructed, when its quality
is evaluated. In this case, if the value of software output is lower than desired, improvements to
the software product (or the software construction process) are proposed. Preventive actions
include software development good practice guidelines. Corrective actions encompass the
activities proper to software evaluation.
Here, we talk about evaluation of quality attributes, not about prevention (design for, how to
build for)
                                                     
16 Software Engineering Economics. Prentice Hall. January 1994.
17 IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology. ANSI IEEE Std, 1983. IEEE Computer Society.
18 B. Beizer. Software Testing Techniques. International Thomson Computer Press, second edition, 1990.
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As Harrold19 claims, evaluation is a highly important process, as it is directed at assuring
software quality. Evaluation works by studying the software system to gather information about
its quality. According to Juristo,20 evaluation involves examining the developed product (code
or other intermediate products) under evaluation and judging whether it meets the desired
quality level (if it does, development can continue; otherwise, the evaluated product should be
reworked to raise its quality).
3.4 Quality Attributes
Quality is a very broad concept. Therefore, the best way to deal with it is by subdividing it into
sub-concepts, which are named quality attributes or criteria. Currently, there is not a universally
accepted set of quality attributes for a software system. However, one of the most popular is the
one proposed by ISO.21 Table 1 shows this set.
The rest of this section reviews many of the techniques that evaluate each of the attributes that
appear in Table 1. The titles of the following sections take their name from the quality attribute
that evaluate and/or the name of the techniques that evaluate them.
3.5 Fault Detection Techniques (Functionality Validation)
The products obtained during software development can be evaluated according to two different
strategies: Static analysis and Dynamic analysis (testing).
These two strategies are often confused and both are mistakenly grouped under the term
testing.22 However, there are significant differences between static and dynamic analyses of a
product. The difference between the two strategies is best understood by making a distinction
between the aspects of the software products to be evaluated.
On the one hand, there are static criteria, which are related to visible properties with the system
at rest; on the other hand, there are dynamic criteria, which are related to properties that are only
manifest when the system is operational. Static analysis can be used to evaluate static criteria
and involves examining the product under evaluation at rest. Therefore, static analysis looks for
faults. Dynamic analysis, or testing, can be used to evaluate dynamic criteria, which means that
it examines the result of operating the system as opposed to the product directly. The dynamic
analysis of a software product implies execution, as only by studying the result of this execution
                                                     
19 M.J.Harrold. Testing: A roadmap. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on the Future of Software Engineering,
pp 63-72, Limerick, Ireland, May 2000. IEEE Computer Society/ACM Press.
20 N. Juristo. Editors introduction. Knowledge Based Systems, 11(2):77-85, October 1998.
[ISO, 1998] ISO Standard ISO9126-1998.
21 ISO Standard ISO9126-1998.
22 A. Bertolino. Guide to the knowledge area of software testing. Software Engineering Body of Knowledge, February 2001.
-24-
NLR-TP-2004-256
is it possible to decide whether or not (or to what extent) the quality levels set for the dynamic
aspects judged are met. Therefore, dynamic analysis looks for failures. The task performed by a
system during execution for the purposes of running a dynamic analysis is what is known as
workload or simply test cases.
At present, the executable software product par excellence is code (although there are some
executable specification and design languages, their use is not very widespread). Therefore, any
product obtained during development (including code) can be evaluated by means of static
analysis. However, dynamic analysis (or testing) almost exclusively evaluates code.
CHARACTERISTICS AND
SUBCHARACTERISTICS
DESCRIPTION
Functionality
Characteristics relating to achievement of the basic purpose for which the software is
being engineered
Suitability The presence and appropriateness of a set of functions for specified tasks
Accuracy The provision of right or agreed results or effects
Interoperability Softwares ability to interact with specified systems
Security Ability to prevent unauthorized access, whether accidental or deliberate, to programs and
data
Compliance Adherence to application-related standards, conventions, regulations in laws and protocols.
Reliability
Characteristics relating to capability of software to maintain its level of performance
under stated conditions for a stated period of time
Maturity Attributes of software that bear on the frequency of failure by faults in software
Fault tolerance Ability to maintain a specified level of performance in cases of software faults or
unexpected inputs
Recoverabiltiy Capability and effort needed to re-establish level of performance and recover affected data
after possible failure
Compliance Adherence to application-related standards, conventions, regulations in laws and protocols
Usability
Characteristics relating to the effort needed for use, and on the individual assessment
of such use, by a stated or implied set of users
Understandability The effort required for a user to recognize the logical concept and its applicability
Learnability The effort required for a user to learn its application, operation, input and output
Operability The ease of operation and control by users
Attractiveness The capability of the software to be attractive to the user
Compliance Adherence to application-related standards, conventions, regulations in laws and protocols
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Efficiency
Characteristics related to the relationship between the level of performance of the
software and the amount of resources used, under stated conditions
Time behavior The speed of response and processing times and throughput rates in performing its
function
Resource utilization The amount of resources used and the duration of such use in performing its function
Compliance Adherence to application-related standards, conventions, regulations in laws and protocols
Maintainability
Characteristics related to the effort needed to make modifications, including
corrections, improvements or adaptation of software to changes in environment,
requirements and functional specifications
Analyzability The effort needed for diagnosis of deficiencies or causes of failures, or for identification
parts to be modified
Changeability The effort needed for modification fault removal or for environmental change
Stability The risk of unexpected effect of modifications
Testability The effort needed for validating the modified software
Compliance Adherence to application-related standards, conventions, regulations in laws and protocols
Portability
Characteristics related to the ability to transfer the software from one organization
or hardware or software environment to another
Adaptability The opportunity for its adaptation to different specified environments
Installability The effort needed to install the software in a specified environment
Co-existence The capability of a software product to co-exist with other independent software in
common environment
Replaceability The opportunity and effort of using it in the place of other software in a particular
environment
Compliance Adherence to application-related standards, conventions, regulations in laws and protocols
Table 1. Software Quality Characteristics and Attributes—ISO 9126-1998 View
3.5.1 Testing Techniques
There is sometimes some confusion as to the testing process and it is mistakenly thought that a
testing technique outputs faults, when it really outputs test cases. On other occasions, one finds
that the testing process in routine practice boils down to executing the software as many times
as deemed necessary (or as often as there is time to), and testing with randomly selected inputs.
Neither the generated test cases, nor the stop testing condition are ever reported. Neither is a
proper estimate of the time and resources that will be necessary to run the tests ever made.
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However, in order to properly test a system it is necessary to follow a well-defined process.
Here, we show the one contemplated by ESA: PSS-06.23
1. Test planning. The purpose of this activity is to identify the characteristics or quality
attributes of the software to be tested, the rigour with which they are to be tested, any
characteristics not to be tested, and the software elements that are to be tested. Also
resources (personnel, tools, etc.) will be allocated to each of the tasks to be performed, and
the testing techniques to be used will be selected.
2. Test design. For each test identified in the above activity, the selected testing techniques
will be applied and the generated test cases will be identified.
3. Test case specification. For each generated test case, the elements it affects must be
identified, and both the inputs required to execute the test case and the expected outputs
and resources (software or hardware) required to run the test cases must be specified. Also
the test cases will be ordered depending on how they are to be executed.
4. Test procedure definition. For each generated test case, the steps to be taken to correctly
execute each generated test case must be specified.
5. Test procedure execution. Each generated test case will be executed according to the
associated test procedure defined.
6. Analysis of the results. For each test procedure executed, the version of the software
elements involved in the test, as well as the characteristics of the environment in which the
test was run must be referenced. A description will be given of test execution (author, test
starting and finishing time), as well as the results of the test (success or failure).
The testing process (the six aforementioned steps) is considered as one of the most costly
development processes,24 sometimes exceeding fifty per cent of total development costs.
Bearing in mind the testing process defined above, it can be found that one of the many factors
that influence the cost of testing is the number of designed test cases (step 2). This means that
the more test cases are generated, the longer it will take to specify and execute the tests and,
therefore, the more costly they will be. It is well known that exhaustive testing, or the execution
of all the possible combinations of input values is infeasible. For example, it will take as many
test cases as there are possible combinations for summing any two numbers to test a program as
simple as a sum of two numbers and this would consume precious time. Therefore, the tests will
be run on a relatively small set25 previously selected from all the possible cases. The choice of
test cases is of utmost importance, not only because the resulting set has to be reduced to the
minimum, but also because this set must allow the software system to comprehensively
                                                     
23 ESA software engineering standards PSS-05-0. Software Engineering Standards ISSN 0379 4059, European Space Agency
(ESA), ESTEC, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, February 1991. ESA Board for Software Standardisation and Control (BBSC).
24 B. Beizer. Software Testing Techniques. International Thomson Computer Press, second edition, 1990.
25 B. Beizer. Software Testing Techniques. International Thomson Computer Press, second edition, 1990.
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demonstrate the aspect under evaluation. If this aspect cannot be sufficiently exhibited using the
selected set of test cases, the tests will have failed to achieve their objective, because they will
not have examined the software properly.
Testing techniques actually focus on the choice of a set of test cases from all the possible test
cases, an activity that conforms to the third point of the process explained above. This means
that the problem of choosing test cases for a software project is actually the selection of one or
more testing techniques.
We now discuss various testing techniques.
The techniques for functionality validation that will be presented here are:
• Blackbox testing (also called Functional testing)
• Equivalence classes and input partition testing.
• Boundary value analysis.
• Error guessing.
• White-box testing (also called Structure based testing)
• Control flow analysis.
• Data flow analysis.
• Cause consequence diagram.
• Other techniques
3.5.1.1 Black Box Testing (Functional Testing)
Equivalence Classes and Input Partition Testing: The idea behind equivalence partitioning is
that testing is more effective if the tests are distributed over all the different possibilities rather
than testing similar possibilities. Input values which are treated the same way by the software
can be regarded as being in some sense equivalent (they probably follow the same execution
path for example). To choose good test cases, it is better to chose one from each equivalence
partition than to choose all from one partition. This basic philosophy can be applied at different
levels of testing; it is probably better to exercise each menu option once than to leave some
unused and concentrate all testing on only a few. (This must be taken with a grain of salt,
because in some cases it may be better to do the reverse, for example, if only a few options are
critical to users and testing time is severely limited).
For example, if the numbers 0 to 99 are valid, then any of those 99 numbers should be handled
in exactly the same way by the software. If the program works correctly for the value of 7, for
example, it will probably also work correctly for 2, 35, 50, etc. All of the values 0 to 99 are
within the same equivalence class or equivalence partition.
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The values less than 0 form another equivalence partition: that of the invalid values below the
valid partition. The values 100 and above form a third invalid partition above the valid partition.
Choosing the three test values of 25, 50 and 150 is more likely to reveal an error than the
values of 49, 50, and 51. (But see Boundary Value Analysis below).
This is an over-simplification to illustrate the basic principle, and makes the assumption that an
input variable is independent of other variables, which is rarely the case in practice. Equivalence
partitions may also be dependent on previous input or data values stored, or on some other
context factor. For example, an order quantity of 0 to 99 might be valid in isolation, but if it
were referring to items packed in sets of six, not all values would be valid.
Boundary Value Analysis: The values that lie at the edge of an equivalence partition are called
boundary values. One of the most common types of coding error is for the boundary of the
equivalence partition to be out by one. In addition to choosing one value from each partition,
chose values on each side of each partition boundary. The boundaries in the example are where
the invalid partitions meet the valid partition: one boundary is between 1 and 0, the other is
between 99 and 100. Those boundary values, -1, 0, 99 and 100 can determine whether the
processing is correct for the boundaries. If the loop control is out by one, then for example, 99
might be regarded as invalid, or 100 as valid.
Again, this is an oversimplification, assuming that a variable is linearly independent from any
other variables. Domain Testing is the formalization of this type of partition strategy.
Boundary Value Analysis is more prescriptive than Equivalence Partitioning, since any value in
a partition is regarded as equally valid as a test case for equivalence partitioning, but the
particular values for the boundaries are determined by those boundary values.
Equivalence partitions and boundary conditions can exist on output values, as well as on input
values. Test cases should be devised to attempt to achieve both valid and invalid output values,
and to test at the output partition boundaries.
There can also be hidden boundaries, which should also be tested for, since thy often result in
unexpected failures. Hidden boundaries are related to internal structure, for example, the disc-
block transfer size. If 256 characters fill a block, test with 256 and 257 characters.
For real rather than integer values, the boundary values would include the boundary value and
small ranges on each side of that value. For integer values, the boundary can be thought of as
being between two values, or on one of the values. Some variants of boundary value analysis
would result in three values, on, above and below the boundary.
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Error Guessing: A good tester often has a feel for where the tricky errors might be lurking, and
can guess at the best-input cases to find those errors. This intuition is based on previous
experience or on common assumptions made by developers. Examples of good test cases are:
division by zero, an empty file, record, or field, negative numbers, alphabetic character for
numeric field, decimal point, embedded comma, minimum and maximum sizes. The test suite
should contain any such test cases which are suggested; if test cases are considered unnecessary
because they would never happen, that is likely to be a good test case.
3.5.1.2 White (Glass) Box Testing (Structure-Based Testing)
Control Flow Analysis: Control flow techniques are based on the internal control of the
software. Although the function of the software is used to determine what the predicted outcome
is for a given input, the choice of test cases is driven by looking inside the box, and choosing
test items to exercise the required parts of the control. Control Flow testing is most effectively
used as a way to evaluate the effectiveness of functional testing, by analysing the structural
coverage gaps have been identified, then control flow techniques are used to derive test cases to
exercise the parts of the control which have not yet been exercised.
Data Flow Analysis: Data flow testing is concerned with what happens to data elements in a
program. A variable is defined when a value is stored into it, such as in an assignment or a
read or input operation. (Note that defined is not the same as declared when the variable
name, without a value, is made known to the compiler, although some declarations are also
definitions.) A value is used when the value determines some processing, such as in a
condition of an IF statement, or when it is printed as output. The tests are derived so that
adequate definition-use associations are exercised by test cases, or existing test cases are
evaluated to determine the coverage achieved in terms of data flow elements. See data flow
testing and also Beizer.24
Cause Consequence Diagrams: Cause-effect graphing is a systematic way of organising
combinations of inputs (causes) and outcomes (effects) into test cases.
There are different variations of this technique; some involve constructing a logic diagram
using logical operators such as And and Or, and then constructing a decision table from the
diagram.26 Other variants omit the logic diagram and go directly to the decision table.
The cause-effect analysis involves examining a specification, optionally constructing a Boolean
network to express the effects as related to the combinations of causes, eliminating any
                                                     
26 G.J.Myers. The Art of Software Testing.  Wiley Interscience, 1979.
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redundant combinations, and constructing a decision table summarizing the conditions and
actions. Test cases are then derived from the decision table, and can also take boundary
conditions into account. Eliminating different inputs, which result in the same output, and then
combining for do not care entries can often simplify the cause-effect graph.
3.5.2 Other Techniques
There are other techniques, which are now a matter of research. These are:
• Error seeding.
• Performance modelling.
• Prototyping/animation.
• Process Simulation.
• Techniques for certain kinds of systems (GUIs, COTS, real-time systems, etc.).
3.6 Static Techniques
Static techniques for functionality validation include:
• Inspections.
• Walk-throughs.
• Reviews.
• Audits.
• Other techniques.
3.6.1 Inspections
Inspections are one of the most effective, yet lowest-technology, quality assurance techniques
that can be applied to software development at all stages of the life cycle. Inspections have the
obvious benefit of locating errors in code or other documentation. Fagan also viewed them as a
contributor to disciplined development. By requiring inspections at various points in the
development life cycle, software engineers not only improved the quality of the work products
involved, but also gained valuable data on defect injection and resolution.
The completeness of a software product is most often determined by testing. Inspections can
also contribute to the determination of when a product is ready for shipment. In Fagans original
data, design and code inspections located 82% of all errors in a specific product. Acceptance
tests and actual use by a customer for six months revealed zero defects. If an organization
maintains records of inspection results and all other defect identification methods, it can
determine the average percentage of errors located by the process and thus indicate when a
product is ready to move on to the next step in development.
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Inspections are a team activity. Four people can accomplish most inspections: the producer of
the item to be inspected, a moderator to facilitate the process, and two technically competent
inspectors. One of the persons also acts as a recorder. The inspection is preceded by a period of
preparation, usually not less than one hour, by each member of the group. The inspection itself
(a meeting) is usually limited to two hours, since longer duration tends to reduce the efficiency
of the team. After the inspection comes a period of follow-up, beginning with a report and
ending with the closure of open items such as the disposition of major defects.
3.6.2 Walkthroughs
A Walkthrough is a static analysis technique in which a designer or programmer leads members
of the development team and other interested parties through a segment of documentation or
code, and the participants ask questions and make comments about possible errors, violation of
development standards, and other problems.  A Walkthrough is conducted, in many cases, with
participants who are non-peers.
A principal distinguishing factor of a walkthrough and a formal inspection is that the inspection
is always a peer review. A moderator leads it whereas a reader or presenter will lead the
walkthrough and the collection of anomalies is carefully structured to capture statistical
evidence of the effort.
3.6.3 Reviews
A review is a process or meeting during which a work product, or a set of work products, is
presented to project personnel, managers, users, customers, or other interested parties for
comment or approval.
A formal review is typically one that is required by a contract commitment, which is usually
invoked through the application of a standard. The implication is that it is a contractual
milestone witnessed by the customer, and denotes the completion of certain activities such as
detailed design. Another view is that there is certain obligation that needs to be met or satisfied.
Informal reviews are those that are held which are not contractually required, such as technical
interchange meetings, where the purpose is one of providing a periodic interchange of
information.
3.6.4 Audits
An audit is much like an inspection, but tends to be more defined according to purpose and is
usually conducted using defined criteria. An example is the physical configuration audit, In the
general form an audit is an independent examination of a work product or set of work products
to assess compliance with specifications, standards, contractual agreements, or other criteria.
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3.6.5 Other Techniques
Other techniques include:
• Sneak circuit analysis.
• Symbolic execution.
3.7 Failure Detection Techniques (Reliability Validation)
There are numerous techniques related to reliability validation including:
• Control flow monitoring:
• Watchdog.
• Dynamic logic.
• Signature analysis/memorised executed cases.
• Exception handling.
• Run time automatic detection
• Data monitoring:
• Assertions/plausibility checks.
• Integrity checks/detection codes.
• Defensive programming.
3.8 Usability Validation
Techniques for usability validation include:
• Expert reviews
• Heuristic evaluation.
• Inspections (conformance, consistency, and collaborative usability).
• Walkthroughs (pluralistic, cognitive).
• Usability tests
• Thinking aloud.
• Measured performance
• Field usability testing
• Follow-up studies of installed system
• Questionnaires and surveys.
• Interviews.
• Focus groups.
• Logging actual use.
• User feedback.
• Other techniques
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3.8.1 Expert Reviews
Heuristic Evaluation: Heuristic evaluation is performed to identify the usability problems of a
system, so that they can be attended to as part of an iterative design process. It involves having a
small set of evaluators examine the interaction design and judge its compliance with recognised
usability principles (the heuristics). It can be used as a complement to usability testing with
users, since it usually reveals different kinds of usability problems than usability testing.
Inspections (conformance, consistency, and collaborative usability): Inspections have a long
history in software development. The goal of all inspections is to find defects. Usability
inspections are aimed at identifying usability defects. The object of inspection may be a finished
product, a design or a prototype. Usability inspections refer to systematic processes for
inspection, as opposed to heuristic evaluation, which is a less formal usability assessment
technique. When different stakeholders perform the inspection in a collaborative effort, it is
called collaborative usability inspection. In this case, the review process is a team effort that
includes software developers, end users, application or domain experts and usability specialists,
collaborating to perform a thorough and efficient inspection. There are two variants of
inspection, which have a specific focus: consistency inspections and conformance inspections.
Walkthroughs (pluralistic, cognitive): A pluralistic usability walkthrough is a collaborative
process involving users, developers and other stakeholders, where all participants are expected
to play the role of users. The participants evaluate the interaction design by trying to perform a
given task, and they stop at each step to have a group discussion about its usability. The goal of
the technique is coordinated empathies to help developers to put themselves in the shoes of
users.
Cognitive walkthrough is a technique for evaluating user interfaces by analysing the mental
processes required of users. Like heuristic evaluation, the results are based on the judgement of
the cognitive walkthrough analyst, instead of on results with real users. The difference is that it
is focused on specific tasks, instead of on assessing the usability of the system as a whole.
In a cognitive walkthrough, correct sequences of actions are analysed, asking if users will
actually follow them. The cognitive walkthrough analyst identifies problems by tracing the
likely mental processes of a hypothetical user. The analysis considers matters like user
background knowledge that influence mental processes but are not part of the user interface.
The technique aims to identify likely usability problems in the user interface and to suggest
reasons for these problems. Cognitive walkthroughs were developed for systems that can be
learned by exploratory browsing, but they are useful even for systems that require substantial
learning.
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3.8.2 Usability Tests
Thinking Aloud (constructive interaction, retrospective testing, critical incident taking,
and coaching method): Thinking aloud is a technique for performing usability tests with users.
The evaluator asks participants (users) to talk out loud while working during a usability testing
session, indicating what they are trying to do, or why they are having a problem, what they
expected to happen that did not, what they wished had happened, and so on. By verbalising their
thoughts, test participants enable the developer to understand how they view the system, and
this helps to identify major user misconceptions.
The strength of thinking out loud is on qualitative data and not on performance measures. The
idea is to get the users impression while using the system to avoid later rationalisations. The
aim of this kind of testing is to detect the parts of the dialogue that are more problematic from a
usability point of view, along with the real causes of the problems.
There are some variants of this technique: constructive interaction, retrospective testing, critical
incident taking and coaching method.
Measured Performance (Usability Specifications Measurement): Performance measurement
through usability testing is used for assessing whether usability goals set in usability
specifications have been met. It can be used as well for comparisons with competing products.
Performance is measured by having a group of users perform a predefined set of test tasks while
collecting time and error data. When the test is performed in a special room prepared for
usability testing, it is called laboratory usability testing. A laboratory is usually composed of
two rooms separated by a one-way mirror:
• The evaluation room where participants carry out the tests and the main evaluator gives
instructions; and
• The control room, where additional evaluators and other members of the development team
can observe the test, without disturbing the test participant.
Usual equipment for a usability laboratory includes a video camera to record the screen, another
one for recording the participant, tools for software logging and monitors to show in the control
room what is happening in the evaluation room.
The opposite to laboratory testing is field testing, where the system is taken to the user
environment instead of taking the participant to the system, and the usability test is performed in
the user organization.
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Field Usability Testing (direct observation, beta-testing, video recording, verbal protocol):
Individual users may be directly observed doing specially devised tasks or doing their normal
work, with the observer making notes about interesting behaviour or recording their
performance in some way, such as timing sequences of actions. This is called direct observation.
When the observation takes place in the user organization, it is called field usability evaluation.
Video recording can be either an alternative to direct observation or a backup for what happens
in a usability evaluation session. For field usability evaluation, audio recording can be useful as
well to record the user comments.
3.8.3 Follow-up Studies of Installed Systems
Questionnaires and Surveys: Questionnaires are used to determine a users subjective
satisfaction with the system. Measuring user satisfaction provides a subjective (but,
nevertheless, quantitative) usability metric for the related usability attribute. Some usability
specifications will be related to user satisfaction, and questionnaires are the way to check
whether the level specified for this attribute has been reached. Questionnaires are usually
administered to usability test participants after the test has taken place, so they can give their
opinion about specific parts of the user interface and about the overall system.
When questionnaires are distributed to a lot of users, they are called surveys. While
questionnaires issued to usability test participants may contain questions about specific parts
that have been used in the test, surveys usually gather opinions on more generic issues.
Additional information that is usually collected has to do with individual user characteristics,
such as background (age, gender, education), experience with computers, familiarity with
specific features (virtual reality, macros, shortcuts), and so on.
Interviews (structured, flexible): Interviews involve having an interviewer read questions to a
respondent and writing down the responses. After usability testing the evaluator may interview
the participant to get the users subjective opinion, instead of letting the participant fill in a
written questionnaire. Interviews are more flexible, since the evaluator may ask follow-up
questions that not were in the script.
Focus Groups: Focus groups are a somewhat informal technique that can be used to assess user
needs and feelings, after the system has been in use for some time. Focus groups often bring out
spontaneous reactions and ideas from users through the interaction between the participants and
have the major advantage of allowing some group dynamics and organizational issues. Focus
groups are especially appropriate for limited user communities.
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Logging Actual Use (time-stamped keystrokes and interaction logging): Logging involves
having the computer automatically collect statistics about the detailed use of the system. It is
mainly used to collect information about the field use of a system after release, but it can also be
used as a supplementary method during usability testing to collect more detailed data. It is
unobtrusive, so it does not interfere with the users normal usage of the system.
When the actual use of the system is logged, this information is particularly useful because it
shows how users perform their actual work and because it is relatively easy to automatically
collect data from a large number of users working under different circumstances. Typically, an
interface log will contain statistics about the frequency with which each user has used each
feature in the system, and the frequency with which various events of interest (like, for example,
error messages) have occurred.
When undertaking a major redesign for a system that has been in use, it is very helpful to rely
on interaction log information to guide the redesign effort.
User Feedback (online or telephone consultants, online bulletin board or newsgroups, user
newsletters and conferences): Once the system is in use, the user community is the best source
for information on the usability weaknesses of the system. User Feedback can be collected by
giving them access to special electronic mail addresses, network newsgroups, or bulletin boards.
Users can send their complaints and requests for change or improvement.
3.8.4 Other Techniques
Other techniques include:
• Experimental Tests
• Predictive Metrics
• Acceptance Tests
• Cooperative Evaluation
• Participative Evaluation
3.9 Efficiency Validation
Techniques related to efficiency validation include:
• Avalanche/stress testing.
• Performance requirements.
• Other techniques.
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3.9.1 Avalanche/Stress Testing
Stress testing or load testing is done to check for problems that may occur when the system is
subjected to input values or environment conditions that exceed their expected range during
normal operation of the system. Stress testing of the software that controls a telephone switch
capable of handling up to 1024 calls, for example, might include gradual increase of the number
of calls up to and beyond 1024, as well as simultaneous initiation of 1024 calls.
3.9.2 Performance Requirements
This is done to determine if the system meets or exceeds specified performance criteria, such as
response-time to user commands and system throughput. Performance testing of the telephone
switch would measure the time required to establish a new connection under various load
conditions of the switch, including no existing calls, 100 existing calls, and 1023 existing calls.
3.9.3 Other Techniques
Other technique that has not been taken into account here is the Response Timings and Memory
Constraints.
3.10 Maintainability Validation
Techniques related to maintainability validation include:
• Regression testing.
• Other techniques.
3.10.1 Regression Testing
When existing (tested) software is changed, additional testing is required in tow areas: testing
for expected changes and testing for unexpected changes. The altered or additional software
should be tested for expected changes, to check that the new expected results are correct; this is
depth testing. Software, which has not been changed, should be tested for unexpected changes
or side effects; this testing is called regression testing.27 This is because one must be concerned
with ensuring that the software has not regressed (gone backwards) to an erroneous state
(linguistically it should be called anti-gression testing, but it is known as regression testing).
3.10.2 Other Techniques
Other techniques include:
• Impact Analysis
• Reverify Changed Software Modules
                                                     
27 G.J.Myers. The Art of Software Testing.  Wiley Interscience, 1979.
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• Reverify Affected Software Modules
• Revalidate Complete System
• Software Configuration Management
• Data Recording and Analysis
3.11 Portability Validation28
Portability requirements may require the software to be run in a variety of environments.
Attempts should be made to verify portability by running a representative selection of system
tests in all the required environments. If this is not possible, indirect techniques may be
attempted. For example if a program is supposed to run on two different platforms, a
programming language standard (e.g., ANSI C) might be specified and a static analyser tool
used to check conformance to the standard. Successfully executing the program on one platform
and passing the static analysis checks might be adequate proof that the software will run on the
other platform.
4 Verification and Validation: Evolution and Enhancement
In this section we discuss the possible evolution of verification and validation technologies as
they pertain to embedded systems.
In the area of embedded systems, more specifically in the context of avionics systems, the main
constraint is safety. Safety is traditionally achieved by combining architectural design with
approaches allowing the verification of functional, safety, and real time performance of software
and systems in such a way that the behavior of the system is always predictable.
In the last few years, avionics systems have evolved in a significant way as it may be observed
at the two major aeronautics manufacturer Boeing and Airbus: the trend is to replace classical
approaches to avionics by Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA).29 This evolution may be
schematically described as follows:
• In classical avionics, embedded systems are made of one computer for each embedded
function (E.g., flight command system, autopilot, or flight management system). Whenever
                                                     
28 Description from ESA software engineering standards PSS-05-0. Software Engineering Standards ISSN 0379 4059, European
Space Agency (ESA), ESTEC, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, February 1991. ESA Board for Software Standardisation and
Control (BBSC).
29 Useful links on Integrated Modular Avionics may be found at http://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/~philippa/IMA_LINKS.html.
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two functions had to communicate with each other, a physical connection is drawn between
their support computers.
• In IMA, a set of computers provides generic resources to a set of functions. They are linked
to each other by means of an avionics embedded network. In this context, functions now
share computer resources (e.g., computational or memory) and communication resources.
This new orientation gives rise to a set of new complex problems which were solved de facto by
the architectural choice of classical avionics:
• Two functions sharing a given resource must be isolated from each other, especially if
these two functions do not have the same level of criticality.
• End-to-end performance of function connection must be predictable; this has consequences
both on the use of shared computer resources and on the communication medium.
So major problems in the area of Verification and Validation of embedded systems are
concerned with:
• Middleware, the central point being that the operating system allow functions to share the
resources.
• Application software, which are to be run on a specific computer resource.
• Communication systems.
• Man-Machine Interfaces, which have specific concerns. Indeed, the use of digital display,
and the complexity and variety of information the pilot is to be provided with, demand
special care.
Finally IMA opens the path toward modular verification and validation and the way to take it
into account in a certification process.30
Whatever the properties to be controlled may be, there are two classes of approach to
verification and validation. They are either
• Based on human operation and expertise and may be qualified rather empirical even though
they are computer aided.
• Automated and may be based on formal notation tools and methods to produce, or to check
the properties of the embedded software.
                                                     
30For further discussion, see http://techreports.larc.nasa.gov/ltrs/PDF/2002/cr/NASA-2002-cr212130.pdf.  
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An Architecture Description Language (AADL), devoted to Avionics systems, is currently in
the process of standardization under the SAE authority. Although such a language is rather
syntactic it provides an open framework, which is a relevant place to incorporate formal
approaches.31
4.1 Software Partitioning
The problem of partitioning in software applications is a central one in the context of an IMA
system. An exhaustive overview has been made some years ago by John Rushby,32 in which
formal approaches used in the area of computer security are shown to apply also to this specific
area. Its is worth noting that the results take into account both space and time partitioning and
are therefore useful for functional and performance analysis.
4.2 Model checking
Model checking has proved to be a relevant approach to master functional and behavioral
properties of embedded software and numerous success stories are documented. Nevertheless,
the approach does suffer from the well-known problem of combinatory explosion. So tentative
work is being conducted to reduce this drawback by combining model checking with other
formal approaches. In the area of avionics embedded systems, the European project Safeair
plans to use bounded model checking, symbolic execution and proved automated code
generation and to map it onto an IMA architecture in an Avionics Systems Development
Environment.33
4.3 Static Analysis
Static analysis by means of abstract interpretation has been extensively explored in the
European Daedalus project. The aim of the project is to use this technique to check various
properties of embedded software. Among them,
• Precision control of floating point arithmetic.
• Timing analysis of parallel asynchronous programs.
• Modular analysis of program composition.
The results apply to avionics software and give excellent perspectives for functional properties
checking, but also for time and performance properties.34
                                                     
31 For further information, see http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~cdgill/RTAS03/published/SAEAADLRTASv1.pdf.
32 For further information, see http://www.csl.sri.com/~rushby/papers/faaversion.pdf for general results and
http://www.tttech.com/technology/docs/formal_verifications/Rushby_2001-03-Partitioning_in_TTA.pdf for results pertaining to
time triggered architectures.
33 For further information, see http://www.safeair.org/.
34 For further information, see, for example, http://www.di.ens.fr/~cousot/projects/DAEDALUS/synthetic_summary/index.shtml.
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4.4 Test Case Generation from High Level Specifications
Model-checking based approaches are a way to produce test cases in a fairly simple way:
To test a property P on a system amounts to check that not (P) always holds.
as it is not the case a  model-checker  should provide a counter-example which may be
interpreted both as a test sequence for P and the oracle value. On this topic, see Paul Blakes
publication list.35 This approach is implemented in tools like GATEL36 based on the
synchronous language LUSTRE. As far as this language is underlying the SCADE workshop
used in Airbus, to avionics domain is likely a relevant application. Once again, this supposes a
means to master complexity and combinatorial explosion. A possible way is to combine results
with a statistical model-checking approach.
4.5 Man Machine Interface
Man Machine Interface Verification an Validation give rise to a specific class of problems in the
context of avionics systems as it implies to take into account man in the loop perception and
interaction. A variety of properties have to be checked in relation with both ergonomic and
functional aspects of the interaction. As a consequence, a usual practice in the definition of
MCDU (Multipurpose Control and Display Units)37 is to implement mock-ups from the system
specification and to make an intensive use of simulation before coding. This time consuming
activity, which amounts to testing applied at the mock-up level to validate the specification,
does not alleviate to test the real system after it has been implemented.  Provided that a formal
specification equivalent to the mock-up implementation (with respect to interaction properties)
be at disposal, two improvements may be proposed. The first one consists in replacing testing
by proofs on the specification and may be envisaged for safety and liveness functional
properties. The second one is to use the specification, which has been validated by simulation
thanks to the mock-up, for deriving test cases to be applied to the real system. Both of them may
rely on model checking (as introduced for test case generation). Concerning the provision of a
formal specification, abstract interpretation techniques may be applied to the source code of the
mock-up to extract the part related to interaction.38
4.6 Safety Analysis
Safety analysis has been traditionally addressed in the context of aeronautics systems by
techniques based on Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA).
                                                     
35 Available at http://hissa.nist.gov/~black/Papers/.
36 For further information, see http://www-drt.cea.fr/Pages/List/lse/LSL/Gatel/index.html.
37 For further information, see http://flyreal.free.fr/English/pfd_en.htm and http://www.cas.honeywell.com/ats/products/fms.cfm.
38 For further information, see http://www.cert.fr/en/dtim/publis/CVSI/1999/dsvis99.ps.
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These techniques were complemented, at the level of system analysis, by means of testing and
simulation tools to support FTA.39 This industrial practice may obtain benefit from using formal
methods to link FTA with system specification.40
5 Standards
In air transport, the safety rules and regulations have evolved separately for the various services.
Consequently for any integrated system many, not necessarily harmonized standards apply. All
discussed standards share the notion that software has to be classified according to the system
hazards the software failure would cause or contribute to. This information is obtained from
Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) plus (Preliminary) System Safety Assessment (P)SSA.
Based on this information, the software providing the service will be classified. For each class a
number of standard specific requirements have to be satisfied. Usually, an independent authority
checks compliance with the requirements and approves complying products as fit for use.
This section will concentrate on the software part, in compliance with the Terms of Reference
for the NATO task group. Some verification and validation aspects of the following standards
are discussed:
• DO-178B/ED12B, from the airborne avionics domain.41
• DO-278/ED109, for CNS/ATM (or ground plus satellite) systems.42
• IEC 61508, for general application, being mandated for a/o European railway industry. It
evolved from process industry.43
• As yet unnamed standard from the Eurocontrol EATMP software task force. This standard
has the targets the same area as DO-278/ED109.
• Electronic Flight Bag AC 120-76, aiming at COTS devices in aircraft with many differing
applications.
• DRD 920, an EGNOS program specific standard for positioning systems.44
• IEC 60880-2 for software in the nuclear industry.45
                                                     
39 A useful overview can be found at http://www.faultree.com/.
40 See http://www.cert.fr/esacs/documentation.html for more details.
41 DO-178B / ED12B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, RTCA & EUROCAE, 1992.
42 DO-278/ED109 Guidelines for the communication, navigation surveillance, and air traffic management (CNS/ATM) systems
software integrity assurance, RTCA & EUROCAE, March 2002.
43 IEC 61508 Functional safety: safety related systems, 7 parts, http://ww.iec.ch, December 1998.
44 GNSS-1 Programme implementation phase, EGNOS software engineering standard, to be obtained from the EGNOS
programme office, August 1999.
45 Software for computers important to safety for nuclear power plants, Part 2, software aspects of defence against common
cause failures, use of software tools and of pre-developed software, http://ww.iec.ch, December 2000.
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• FDA 1252 dedicated to software in medical devices.46
• UK SW01, for software safety assurance in Air Traffic services, similar in reach as DO-
278/ED109.47
• Common Criteria, for applications with security concerns, started as a USA-European
military harmonization, but as ISO standard is extending its reach.48
5.1 DO-178B/ED12B
For all software in an aircraft49 this standard applies. Based on the FAR/JAR AC-25-1309 the
following five software levels are defined by DO-178B. For convenience in Table 2 the
FAR/JAR failure frequency definition per flight hour is included.
Level System failure Frequency description FAR/JAR definition
A Catastrophic failure Extremely improbable ... < 10-9
B Hazardous / Severe major Extremely remote 10-9 < ... < 10-7
C Major failure Remote 10-7 < ... < 10-5
D Minor failure Probable 10-5 < ...
E No effect Not applicable -
Table 2 DO-178B/ED 12B overview
Detailed requirements are provided for each level. As it is not possible to measure actual failure
rates at the required low rates, strict process guidance is provided. Complying with this process
is considered sufficient. The excellent air transport safety record up to date does not repudiate
this assumption. Many consider DO-178B as the toughest standard in industry.
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products are officially allowed. However no requirements are
waived. Consequently, only COTS products that have been developed specifically taking all
DO-178B requirements into account can be used. Note that various navigation services50 take
DO-178B into account but deviate on details. The same holds for Galileo, due to its general
domain funding. These examples demonstrate that for large COTS services air transport
requirements will be taken into account but full compliance is not realistic.
                                                     
46 Guidance for FDA reviwers and industry guidance for the content of pre-market submissions for software contained in
medical devices, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh, May 1998.
47 CAP 670 ATS Safety Requirements, UK CAA http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP670.pdf, April 1998.
48 Common criteria (August 1999), Common criteria for security evaluation, Version 21. CCIMB-99-03, 3 parts
http://www.commoncriteria.org/cc/cc.html, also known as ISO/IEC 15408.
49 DO-178B / ED12B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, RTCA & EUROCAE, 1992.
50 See for example
• Wide Area Augmentation System description, http://gps.faa.gov/programs/index.htm, 2003.
• European Geostationary Navigation Overlay System description http://www.esa.int/export/esaSA/navigation.html, 2003.
• MTSAT Satellite- based Augmentation System description http://www.mlit.go.jp/koku/ats/e/mtsat/miss/03.html, 2003.
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Certification involving new software techniques, such as object-orientation, tends to be
troublesome for the first applicant trying to certify it, as DO-178B tends to lag behind the
current state-of-the-art in software engineering.
Certification is required for each nation where an airline wants to acquire an aircraft for civil
use. Airbus has obtained its initial thirteen type certifications over the last ten years from the
JAA, complemented by another thirteen from the FAA plus 130 from other nations. Boeing
obtained 200 certificates in the same period, after the initial certification.51 This should be
improved.
5.2 DO-278/ED109
For ATM ground systems the USA has produced DO-278.52 This standard extends DO-178B.
Table 3 provides an overview of the six Assurance Levels (AL) defined in DO-278. Note that
neither a definition of the assurance levels nor an indication of the allowed failure frequency is
provided.
The use of COTS is acknowledged. Processes are defined for planning, acquisition, verification,
configuration management and quality assurance of COTS. It has to be ensured that unused
capabilities of COTS do not adversely effect the ATM system. An important extension to
DO-178B is that COTS service experience may be used obviating the need to apply a DO-278
compliant development process for some assurance levels. However, the restrictions on service
experience are quite severe. The information on service experience is included in Table 3. One
year means that for a continuous period of 8760 hours of representative use no failure may have
been encountered. Additionally all in-service reports, i.e. including those from other users, have
to be evaluated for their potential adverse effects on the ATM system.
DO-178 level DO-278 assurance level COTS service experience
A AL 1 Not allowed
B AL 2 Negotiate with approval authority
C AL 3 One year
AL 4 Six months
D AL 5 Typically not needed
E AL 6 Not applicable
Table 3 DO-278/ED109 overview
                                                     
51 Holderbach, H.Type certification of commercial aircraft call for enhanced international rules, ICAO Journal 2, 2001.
52 DO-278/ED109 Guidelines for the communication, navigation surveillance, and air traffic management (CNS/ATM) systems
software integrity assurance, RTCA & EUROCAE, March 2002.
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5.3 IEC 61508
From the general domain IEC 6150853 is available. Four Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) are
defined. It states that only for hardware the safety integrity can be quantified and assessed using
reliability prediction techniques. For software qualitative techniques and judgements have to be
made. It explicitly states that failures rates lower then 10-9 per hour, i.e. level A according to
DO-178B or DO-278 AL1, can not be achieved for complex systems, which include every
programmable system. Part 7 aims to provide an exhaustive list of techniques for each process
phase, including recommendations on their use (or avoidance) for each SIL. It is possible to
certify COTS for a certain level, when a IEC 61508 compliant development process is followed.
An independent party does certification. Table 4 provides an overview of the 4 SIL levels.
SIL Failure probability per hour
(systems active > once per year)
Failure probability per demand
(systems active < once per year)
4 10-9 ≤  ...  < 10-8 10-5 ≤  ...  < 10-4
3 10-8 ≤  ...  < 10-7 10-4 ≤  ...  < 10-3
2 10-7 ≤  ...  < 10-6 10-3 ≤  ...  < 10-2
1 10-6 ≤  ...  < 10-5 10-2≤  ...  < 10-1
Table 4 IEC 61508 Safety Integrity Levels
Using service experience is allowed, but in practice hardly possible for higher SIL levels. An
example from the standard states that for a SIL 1 system, 95% confidence in correct functioning
requires 300 hours of relevant service experience. For a SIL 4 system, 99.5% confidence
requires 690,000 years of service experience.
5.4 Eurocontrol EATMP software task force
Eurocontrol has set up the EATMP safety management software ad-hoc task group for the
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) area. Based on the Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory
Requirement,54 a software standard is being drafted. This standard will combine DO-178B, IEC
61508, and the Capability Maturity Model55 into a combined safety and quality assurance
document. Software classification provided in Table 5 is not yet fixed. It is based on ESARR4,
while inserting an additional level identical to DO-178B level B. The requirements on the
evidence that needs to be provided depend on the assurance level.
                                                     
53 IEC 61508 Functional safety: safety related systems, 7 parts, http://ww.iec.ch, December 1998.
54 ESARR 4 Software in ATM Systems, Eurocontrol, http://www.eurocontrol.be/src/html/deliverables.html, October 2002.
55 Paulk, M. C., C. V. Weber, S. M. Garcia, M. B. Chrissis, M. W. Bush, (February 1993), Key Practices of the Capability
Maturity Model, Version 1.1, Software Engineering Institute, http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmm/obtain.cmm.html.
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Software
assurance
level
ESARR4 severity
(Class, effect)
ESARR 4
occurrence
likelihood
Software occurrence
likelihood
(operational-hour)
1a 1 Accidents Improbable N/A
1b DO-178B level B N/A DO-178B Extremely
Remote 10-9 <  < 10-7
2 2 Serious incidents Remote 10-6 < ... < 10-5
3 3 Major incidents Occasional 10-5 < ... < 10-4
4 4 Significant incidents Probable 10-4 < ... < 10-3
5 5 No immediate effect on
safety
N/A N/A
Table 5 Eurocontrol EATMP software assurance levels
5.5 Electronic Flight Bag AC 120-76
The electronic flight bag is a (COTS-based) platform that supports many independent
applications. Traditionally every aircraft application has its own hardware unit. The electronic
flight bag can be part of the aircraft so DO-178B applies. However, it can also be used outside
the aircraft, so a special document, FAA AC120-7656 is available. The electronic flight bag
could be a portable device like a PC or PDA, but it can also be installed in an aircraft. The
electronic flight bag is classified as:
• Class 1 portable COTS device without data link connectivity to the aircraft and not
connected to the aircraft power system or an aircraft mount;
• Class 2 portable COTS device mounted to the aircraft, can connect read-only to the aircraft
data link and can connect to airline AOC information in receive/transmit mode;
• Class 3 installed equipment and consequently DO-178B applies in full.
For Class 1 and 2 equipment DO-178B compliance is not required. To illustrate the usefulness
of Class 1 and Class 2, AC 120-76 lists 64 sample applications for Class 1 and 17 for Class 2.
Class 2 mentions Internet connectivity, which fits well with the TALIS services approach and
the Enterprise Application Integration ideas. There are restrictions on the software manipulation
of electronic maps, even for Class 2, which may limit the benefit of Class 2 applications to
increase pilot situational awareness.
Compliance to AC 120-76 implies compliance to 103 sections of five parts of the US Code of
Federal Regulation (CFR) relating to airworthiness plus 45 additional sections of four parts of
the operating regulations. In case electronic maps are used, DO-25757 applies. Even within AC
                                                     
56 Guidelines for the certification, airworthiness and operational approval of electronic flight bag computing devices, FAA
AC120-76, September 2002.
57 Minimum operational performance standards for the depiction of navigational information on electronic maps, RTCA DO-
257.
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120-76 some parts relate to activities performed only once for the approval of software, other
parts mention an operational approval valid for a specific operator for a specific period of time.
This profusion of standards, regulations, etc., is typical for integrated aviation applications that
aim to increase integration. Consequently, there is a need for a different approach to
certification, which ensures the safety, but omits the many, not necessarily, harmonized
standards and national sovereignty issues.
5.6 DRD 920
For the EGNOS program, ESA has produced a specific standard, DRD 920,58 which combines
the standard space-quality assurance practices PSS05 with DO-178B. Due to the many
subcontractors and re-use of existing software these issues are addressed. ESA acts as customer
as well as certifying authority. Consequently, for EGNOS additional certification activities need
to be performed once EGNOS becomes operational in the member states.
As an annex to DRD 920 the PSAC (Plan for Software Aspects of Certification, a DO-178B
required document) is provided. Its states that 40 DO-178B requirements are satisfied by the
standard, 3 partial, 26 not satisfied and for 4 requirements it is unclear. For the unsatisfied
requirements the contractor has to comply by other means. Human Machine Interface testing
and specialized tools are specifically discussed in DRD 920.
Procured software is approved by ESA. For COTS software certification material is needed to
satisfy the DO-178B objectives. When modifications of re-used software exceed 20% of the
code, it is considered new code. A virus check for COTS is required, merging safety and
security issues. DRD 920 standard describes its own software life cycle, which ignores
iterations, deployment, maintenance and decommissioning. Despite a few useful innovations, it
introduces is yet another standard without a kind of recognition of COTS certification according
to different standards.
5.7 IEC 60880-2
In the nuclear industry IEC 60880-2 is applicable. IEC 6088059 is based on the software
classification provided in IEC 61226 and applies up to the highest level A. The basic single-
failure criterion, the assembly of safety systems remains functional despite a random failure, is
not applicable for software, as a software failure can cause multiple systems to fail. As a
consequence, IEC 60880 devotes an appendix to the pros and cons of multiple diverse software
                                                     
58 GNSS-1 Programme implementation phase, EGNOS software engineering standard, to be obtained from the EGNOS
programme office, August 1999.
59 Software for computers important to safety for nuclear power plants, Part 2, software aspects of defence against common
cause failures, use of software tools and of pre-developed software, http://ww.iec.ch, December 2000.
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implementations. Multiple versions can only cover some fault classes, but an incorrect or
ambiguous specification remains as single failure points.
The standard distinguishes between software tools that can introduce errors and tools that fail to
detect them. The requirements for the former category are strict. Compilers (called translators)
are acknowledged to be too large to demonstrate their correctness. They are trusted under
certain restrictions, unlike DO-178B where binary code needs to be verified for the highest
level. The compiler may not introduce dead code, or code which is not traceable to requirements
(e.g. error handling). Operating experience may compensate for some lack of design
documentation.
COTS, called pre-developed software, are allowed. There are strict requirements on the
evaluation of functions, design documentation etc. In case operating experience is used, there
are requirements on the operating history data. Also after acceptance of the COTS, all error and
failure information has to be assessed for its potential impact on the approved system. The
evidence provided by formal methods is recognized, unlike DO-178B.
5.8 FDA 1252
In the USA, FDA-125260 applies to software in medical devices. The software is classified into
tree levels of concern, see Table 6. As the probability of software failure can not be measured,
only the severity of the software failure consequences is used to determine the level. A table
listing 12 documents describes for each level of concern what type of information is needed, if
any. No specific software life-cycle model is prescribed, but a general V-model for verification
is provided. Verification needs to be performed at module, integration and system level.
Level of concern Severity description
Major Software failures that could cause, directly or indirectly, to death or
serious injury of the patient and / or the operator
Moderate Software failures that could cause, directly or indirectly, to non-serious
injury of the patient and / or the operator
Minor Software failures are not expected to cause injury to patient and / or
operator
Table 6 FDA 1252 Level of concern
Artificial intelligence is allowed, as are neural networks. Even though it is stated that neural
networks are impossible to verify, they are allowed for all levels of concern. Consequently the
assumptions and the training of the neural network need to be verified, but no guidance is
                                                     
60 Guidance for FDA reviewers and industry guidance for the content of pre-market submissions for software contained in
medical devices, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh, May 1998.
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provided. Embedded and real-time systems pose unique concerns, but only the use of
techniques, simulators, and emulators to analyze timing of critical events is mentioned. The
importance of human factors is acknowledged without enforcing verification and validation
requirements. In the same spirit security is raised, but no requirements ensue.
5.9 Software safety assurance in ATS UK SW01
The approach for safety assurance of ATM systems typically differs from the approach for
aircraft. For the latter, a single certification is done, after which all aircraft of the same type are
certified airworthy (in the country issuing the certificate). For services provided by ground
systems, typically the national regulator issues a license to operate for a fixed period of time.
After expiry of the license a periodic review is held and this license is extended for the same
time. Unfortunately for ATM systems, as discussed above, no standard is (yet) internationally
recognized. Even on a European level, harmonization is not completed. As the UK practice is
advanced and informative, it will be discussed. UK-CAP-67061 contains all regulations. The
excerpt Regulatory objective for software safety assurance in air traffic service equipment,
SW0162 focuses on the software part. It defines Assurance Evidence Levels (AEL), to identify
the type, depth and strength of evidence to be provided by the software development process to
the assessor. In this way the developer may use any standard to provide the evidence. Based on
the ESARR 4 safety classification, one AEL is defined for each class. Three types of evidence
are acknowledged: test, field service and analytic. Every type of evidence can be either direct or
backing, with requirements provided for each type.
This goal-oriented approach is more modern. It means that the supplier has to provide the
classification, the type of evidence that is needed, the evidence itself, and reasoning that the
evidence is adequate. This way of working would be more suitable for integrated NATO
services than the profusion of the myriad standards currently available. This approach should be
complemented by a mutual recognition scheme, which means that other countries would
recognize approval in one country, preferably worldwide, but at least within NATO.
5.10 Security
Verification and validation are not only needed in case of safety concerns. It also applies for
security. The Common Criteria63 (CC) from the military domain is an international standard,
which includes requirements on verification and validation. As such it is discussed in this
section on standards.
                                                     
61 CAP 670 ATS Safety Requirements, UK CAA http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP670.pdf, April 1998.
62 http://www.caa.co.uk/srg/ats/default.asp?page=1371.
63 Common criteria (August 1999), Common criteria for security evaluation, Version 21. CCIMB-99-03, 3 parts
http://www.commoncriteria.org/cc/cc.html,  also known as ISO/IEC 15408.
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The Common Criteria aims to provide objective evidence about the product security level.
Qualified and officially recognized assessors perform the objective and repeatable evaluation,
much like for safety certification. The evaluation can lead to a certificate, which is currently
recognized by 14 countries, including the USA, Canada, and several European NATO countries.
Security aims to prevent:
• Damaging disclosure of the service to unauthorized recipients (loss of confidentiality);
• Damage through unauthorized modification (loss of integrity);
• Damage through unauthorized deprivation of access to the asset (loss of availability).
Environment
Threats
Security policy
Security
Requirements
(Protection Profile)
(Security Target)
Evidence Assurance
Level
Product Deployment
Security functions
CC part 2
Evidence Guidance
Approved and
registered productEvaluation
Software development
process
Figure 1 Overview common criteria
# of COTS productsEAL Description
Certified In evaluation
1 Functionally tested, security threats not serious 7 0
2 Structurally tested, low to moderate assurance 18 11
3 Methodically tested and checked, maximum
assurance without infringing sound development
practise
14 2
4 Methodically designed, tested and reviewed,
maximum assurance compatible with good
commercial practise
28 23
5 Semi-formally designed and tested, maximum
assurance with moderate security engineering
1 0
6 Semi-formally verified design and tested, protect
high value assets against significant risk
0 0
7 Formally verified design and tested, extremely
high risk situations and/or high assets values
0 0
Total # of COTS products 68 36
Table 7 Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level
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The security environment provides the context of the asset. Combined with the perceived threats
and the security policy the security requirements can be derived. These requirements consist of
a re-usable Protection Profile (PP) and an asset specific Security Target (ST). Based on these
requirements and the extensive listing of possible security functions in the common criteria part
2, the security functions of the system are determined. Separately the protection level is
determined, which determines the amount of implementation and evaluation effort. Table 7
provides an overview of the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL), plus the amount of COTS
products in the register at the time of writing.
The Common Criteria does add yet another level of requirements on the application
development processes; so harmonization with the safety requirements is advantageous.
6 Certification
In this section, we examine the certification of embedded systems. First we review the meaning
and different types of certification and discuss some of the barriers to certification. Next we
address the relevance to NATO and consider a strategy for gaining maximum benefit from
certification.
6.1 Different types of certification (who? what? why?)
Software certification is simply the process of generating a certificate that supports the claim
that the software was either: (1) developed in a certain manner, (2) will exhibit some set of
desirable run-time characteristics, or (3) has some other static characteristic embedded into it.
For example, the certificate could simply state that a particular type of testing was applied and
to what degree or thoroughness; or the certificate could state that the software can be composed
successfully with any other software component with a certain set of predefined characteristics.
Certification may be an attempt to transfer the risk to the certifier, but in many safety situations
the user of the system still remains responsible for the safety.
Two key questions are who does the certification? and what is being certified?
Turning first to the question of who performs the certification. The process of creating a
certificate is typically performed by one of three parties: by the vendor of the software, by a
client of the software, or by an independent third party that is performing the service
independent of the vendor or users.
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Numerous examples of third party certification occur in industries such as electronics (e.g.,
Underwriters Laboratory), aviation (through designated engineering representatives), and
consumer products (e.g., Consumer Reports).  In industrial applications, the TUVs (see
Page 79) dominate the market for the assessment of programmable controllers used in the
process industry and are active in railways and nuclear assessments.
There are also wide ranges of certification activities that support interoperability. For example,
The Open Group certifies that Linux implementations are indeed Linux and that X-windows
conform to their standards. Other examples are protocol testing by telecom laboratories and
compiler testing to demonstrate conformance with a language definition. The rather misnamed
Ada validation suite tests for functional aspects of the compiler not all the required attributes
such as reliability.
It is important to be clear by what is meant by the different kinds of certificates. To begin, these
certificates are typically done as a follow-up check to insure that certain processes were
followed during development; these process certificates are the first type of certification that
will be discussed here.  The second type of software certification often mentioned refers to the
licensing of software engineering professionals; this is still referred to as software certification
but should more appropriately be referred to as professional licensing.  The third and most
important, but most difficult, claim that a certificate can make is to discuss how the software
will behave in use. This is referred to as product certification and that will be our focus here.
Note that there are three key messages that a certificate can convey that are not necessarily the
same:
1. Compliance with standards versus
2. Fitness for purpose versus
3. Compliance with requirements
Compliance with the standards simply means that the standards that were required during
development were indeed followed. However, that does not mean that the product itself is fit for
the purpose that the user needed and it does not necessarily mean that the software complies
with the requirements. The key difference between (2) and (3) is that those two are only
equivalent if the requirements accurately and completely defined what the user needed the
software to do, and thus it is possible that the software meets the requirements but does not
perform as the user needs.  Note that (1) deals with process certification, and (2) and (3) deal
with product certification.
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The beauty of having an accurate certificate is that it allows for a common language (mutual
recognition agreements) to be employed to discuss relatively abstract notions.  As we all know,
software is somewhat amorphous in that, unlike a hardware entity, it is hard to get a handle on
entities that are so abstract.  So from that standpoint, certification standards can be beneficial.
One classic example is the recent adoption by many nations of the Common Criteria, which is
simply a process certificate that defines various security levels and the processes that must be
employed to demonstrate those levels. And further, there are accreditation agencies (e.g., NIST)
that now certify third party companies that actually perform the work and generate the
certificates.
The term Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) has long been used in the NASA and
U.S. DoD communities, and so we now explain how that fits into the certification framework.
To begin, Barry Boehm defines validation as making sure that you are building the right product
and verification as making sure that you build the product right.  And while these terms may
seem confusing, they are both closely related. Little i V&V is simply performing first person
V&V on a system, and big I V&V requires independence, from either a second party or third
party (third party is typically preferred). How IV&V relates to certification is as follows: they
are the same, provided that the type of certification being performed is either a process
certification or product certification.  However there is one caveat: IV&V does not necessarily
result in a certificate.
There is a form of pre-certification or generic certification that gives type approval for a
product. This might certify part of the product such as the operating system core along with the
application development tools. This would allow each new application of the product (e.g., a
programmable logic controller in a process plant) to focus on the fitness for purpose of the
added application-specific code. This amortizes the costs of certification across the many
potential applications.
6.2 Assessment of certification and relevance to NATO requirements
The development, deployment and integration of systems developed and perhaps certified to a
wide range of standards is an inescapable part of the NATO landscape. There are benefits and
threats from this:
Potential benefits:
• Certification can influence the market  minimum requirements that all software should
satisfy might raise the general level of dependability or reduce costs to the use.
• Certification as a basis for gaining assurance.
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• Risk transfer from the user or vendor to the certification authority.
• Guarantees of product behaviour (functional, non-functional).
Potential threats:
• Adding unnecessary costs and delays to projects.
• Giving unwarranted confidence in system behaviour.
• Preventing flexibility, innovation and inter-working, as certificates can be quite narrowly
defined.
• Reducing ability of user to undertake their own examination of a product (why bother if
someone else has already done it?).
One approach is to encourage the certification of civil products so that they can be more readily
used in defence applications. This might be pre-certification or done on a particular project but
of wider benefit (e.g., the level 7* profile for the memory management of some real time
operating systems to be used in the F22 program).
While it unclear as to what the current world market is in software certification, we can look at
the recent NIST report that said in the United States alone, the U.S. lost around $60B as a result
of inadequate software testing in 2001. Certification, perhaps, even self-certification, might
provide one way of making it more obvious to the market the extent to which software products
have been tested and analyzed.
Note that there are two differing camps on certification: there are those that believe any bar
that people are forced to cross is better than no bar at all.  And there are those that believe that
any bar lulls those that produce products into a false sense of security: as long as they do just
enough to cross the bar, then they have done enough to satisfy minimum industry standards. In
practice any certification approach will have an impact on the market and the behaviour of
suppliers and so the issues for NATO are not solely technical and any strategy musty be
cognizant of the, perhaps subtle, interplay of technical, social and market forces.
Future NATO systems are likely to be heterogeneous, dynamic coalitions of systems of systems
and as such will have been built and assessed to a wide variety of differing standards and
guidelines. Here, our main recommendation is that the certification of embedded systems should
be based around the concept of dependability case, generalizing the current requirement for
safety and reliability cases. Reliability case found in U.K. Def Stan 00-42 Part 3,64 which is
on the Reliability and Maintainability Case and Part 2 deals specifically with the software
                                                     
64 The U.K Defence Standards can be obtained from http://www.dstan.mod.uk/.
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reliability case. Similar requirements appear in equivalent NATO standards. Safety cases are
required in U.K. Def Stan 00-55 and in the more recently the U.K. CAA Safety Regulation of
air traffic management systems and its proposals.65
The dependability case should be based on a claims-arguments-evidence66 framework with the
following components:
1. A goal-based view of that expresses certification requirements in terms of a set of claims
about the system and its attributes
2. Evidence that support the claims
3. An explicit set of argument that provides a link from the evidence to the claims
4. For critical systems the underlying assumptions and concepts used to support and formulate
the goals and claims should be described in terms of a series of models (e.g. at system,
architecture, design, implementation levels)
Such a framework should provide the technical basis that allows for inter-working of standards
especially IEC 61508 and DO178B.
While this goal based approach is moving from safety to other dependability areas  (e.g. to
interoperability), it needs supporting technical work and the development of a body of practice.
While there is considerable experience with this approach for safety applications, it will be
novel to many NATO partners and the deployment of the approach would be facilitated by:
1. Guidance on strategies and arguments for demonstrating claims and on how claims might
be derived including guidance on what are useful certifiable and measurable properties
2. Guidance on how evidence is generated by VV&C techniques. This is not found in any
existing standards and we have begun to elaborate recommendation on how evidence is
generated throughout the lifecycle. Details are in Appendix B. It should be noted that
highly critical systems are extremely difficult. To obtain substantially improved MTBF
(beyond commercial software) one requires orders of magnitude in reduction of fault
density.
3. Guidance on pragmatics such as  to feasibility, scalability and tool support.
4. Guidance on the relationship to and interface with frequently used standards.
                                                     
65 CAP670 SW01, “Requirements for Software Safety Assurance in Safety Related ATS Equipment.”
66 An introduction to safety cases on which these ideas are built can be found at www.adelard.com, which hosts the guidance for
the IEE Functional Safety portal on this topic.
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However, perhaps the most compelling study would be one that looked at the return on
investment (ROI) and risk and benefits of the approach. Some work is being performed in the
European nuclear Cemsis project. In this project the cost-benefit claims are:
• Reduced costs particularly assurance costs for critical systems.
• Reduced uncertainty in costs. The extra costs of a safety related system has varied between
6-100% of the cost of a system of normal industrial quality. Uncertainty arises from direct
costs and time
• Reduced time to develop and assure systems important to safety.
• Increased commonality between different countries/utilities and with other industrial
sectors.
6.3 Certification Conclusions
There are disparate forms of certification and they vary widely in their objectives, the level of
detailed information they provide, and their ability to effectively reduce project and system risk.
NATO should encourage certification as a means of supporting interoperability and confidence
in the systems (products) behaving as required. Process certification should support confidence
in the evidence (and normally be a pre-requisite to baseline standards such as ISO9001) but the
overall emphasis of certification should be on the product. We propose that a claim-argument-
evidence-based approach should be adopted as best practice.
We are cautious about the actual arrangements for certification and whether self-certification or
independent certification is required. For critical systems this is likely to be already best practice
and this should be continued. For less critical systems, the benefits of independent oversight
should be assessed and activities that add value to projects identified (rather than just a complex
time consuming overhead).
Critical systems (whether security, safety, operational) pose particular challenges to current
development and certification approaches.
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7 Conclusions and Recommendations
In this final section of the report we summarize our conclusions and recommendations. These
points were formed during the writing of the above sections, but were specifically formed
during two days of meetings in Prague, The Czech Republic, in October 2003.
In general terms, we find that much of our discussion is not specific to embedded systems; the
problems of verification, validation and certification encompass many kinds of systems. We
observe that trust, in itself, is a sociological-technical matter; it is not attained wholly through
technical means.
In the Terms of Reference for the Task Group, it is stated that the
 Task Group is to review the techniques currently used in the software industry to
product high quality products; an appropriate number of methods and software life-cycle
metrics for systems of relevant complexity should also be examined, particularly those
which are supported by fully operational environments. At the conclusion of this activity,
the Task Group should deliver a report addressing the following topics:
Assessment of current technical capabilities and relevance of these techniques and methods
to embedded military systems
Assessment of relative strengths and limitations of these methods
Assessment of current research trends in testing, formal methods, and requirements
traceability
Specific recommendations for military application of these techniques
Recommendation for future NATO IST efforts, if relevant, such as Symposium or
Workshop.
For the rest of this section, we provide a summary discussion of each of the aforementioned
topics.
Assessment of current technical capabilities and relevance of these techniques and methods
to embedded military systems
It is the Task Groups conclusion that certification can be used successfully to increase our
confidence in systems. However, that confidence could be expensive. We have observed that
certification is working with bounded problems and has been particularly successful in the
Avionics arena. However, we also note a couple of cautionary aspects to the use of certification
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in the military realm. Many military systems are not bounded (e.g., consider coalitions), nor,
unlike Telecom for example, are there operational profiles in the battle space.
Further, we note that certification is only as good as the standard one is certifying against and
the individuals who are performing the certification. In fact, there is substantial reliance on
good teams to achieve the requisite goals. There is a threat that standards may become
gameable.
Without doubt, the complexity of a certification grows with system size and complexity. We
can generally certify in the small; the problems of attaining certification of systems-of-
systems are extremely complex and, perhaps, with current technology, not truly achievable for
highly critical systems. We further observe that to obtain substantially improved mean-time-
between-failures, one requires orders of magnitude reduction of fault density.
A bottom line perspective on certification is that it is unclear as to what is the precise message
accruing from certification. There is certainly an element of transferring risk from one
organization to another. However, in the broad scheme, it is an open question what certification
actually achieves. Of concern to the embedded systems charter of the task group, is that
certification generally occurs at the system level, not at that of embedded system components.
So for example, there are concerns pertaining to Integrated Modular Avionics, since it is the
system that is certified, not the component.
Assessment of relative strengths and limitations of these methods
All of the aforementioned methods are extremely difficult to use with highly critical or complex
systems. To obtain substantially improved mean time to failure, one requires orders of
magnitude reduction in the number of faults. In general, there is a complex interplay of
certification, legal issues, licensing, market and technology.
From a technical perspective, we found that current technical capabilities are not well developed
for:
• Verification, validation and certification for component reuse. Obviously a serious
problem, for amortization of the costs of VV&C over component reuse is necessary for
broader adoption of these capabilities.
• Rigorous predictability of the behavior of networks and systems. This inability to attain
predictability will constrain the adoption of systems in highly critical contexts.
• Non-interference of multi-level critical processes.
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Assessment of current research trends of these methods
In the body of this report, we have discussed a number of research trends for embedded systems
and the VV&C of such systems. We observe the following current research trends:
• Increasing use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) systems.
• Increasing occurrence of systems of systems.
• An increasing number (already too numerous) of unharmonised standards. We posit that
the goal-based approach described above could be a potential solution. There are some
preliminary indications of this trend arising from the use of goal-based certification and
regulation as espoused in 00-55 and SW01.
• The ongoing reality of striving for cheaper and faster systems, while attempting to maintain
quality objectives.
• Increasing adoption of formal modeling and analysis techniques in industrial tools.
• Research and development into the complementary aspects of various verification and
validation techniques. For example, the use of automated deduction to extend the reach of
model checking. A further example is the TTA67 Groups efforts to verify functionality and
safety of their Time Triggered Protocol. Formal verification was used to check the
protocols key algorithms for consistency, stability and safety. Fault tolerance behavior and
error detection properties were investigated through the injection of millions of faults. On
the certification side, a number of efforts have been completed. The design and
development process of their key chip (TTP-C2) is documented against aerospace
standards. An operating system and configuration checker are being developed
according to DO-178B (Level A).
• There are numerous challenges in determining fitness for purpose of embedded systems.
An isolated system may be fine, but changing the context to a networked device may open
unsavory issues (e.g. networked SCADA devices). There are further challenges with the
modeling and analysis of embedded systems hardware and software interfaces (sensors).
• A major research area requiring investigation is the interoperability of standards. For
example, if system A is assessed against a standard SA and B is assessed against a standard
SB, what does SA and SB tell us about how A and B will interact?
• Ongoing and heightened (post 9/11) concerns with the security of networked embedded
systems. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are of particular
concern.
• Increased interest at correlating the threat space (whether security or safety) with the
verification, validation and certification techniques to be used.
                                                     
67 See www.tttech.com.
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• A trend towards scenario based software development and towards systems being certified
against scenarios.
• A trend towards the use of goal-based certification and regulation. However, further R&D
supporting goal-based approaches is required. Especially a need to build up a body of
practice and supporting technical work. Exploration is required for the techniques used to
generate evidence, combine evidence, for expressing claims and for the presentation of
evidence.
Specific recommendations for military application of these techniques
The research task group has the following specific recommendations for military applications of
these techniques:
1. That NATO gives serious consideration to using a goal-based approach to certification of
systems.
2. That when performing the verification, validation and certification of critical
components, regardless as to whether the criticality is safety- or security-critical:
• That VV&C be performed and/or assessed by an independent third party.
• Whether such independent third parties should be accredited.
• That objective guidance be provided for required verification and validation artifacts.
• That maximum freedom of Information Technology processes and techniques be
provided within the scope of the VV&C framework.
• That the certification effort reflects the criticality of the system.
3. That for highly critical systems, NATO
• Insert formal modeling and reasoning into their development processes.
• Insert advanced static analysis techniques.
• Apply extensive testing.
4. That for systems of lesser criticality, NATO can consider as a minimum baseline the
following:
• Use standard good quality assurance practices.
• Test, test and test again.
• Perform ongoing error monitoring of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf systems.
• Apply ISO 9000, which is not specific to software.
• Trend to the application of dependability cases, which is already underway under one of
the NATO quality assurance groups.
As noted, this is a minimum baseline. Emerging techniques (such as new static analysis
techniques, innovative approaches to formal analysis and modeling, new testing techniques,
deployment of dependability) should be continually evaluated and prudently incorporated.
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Recommendation for future NATO IST efforts, if relevant, such as Symposium or Workshop
1. Dissemination
The research task group has three recommendations regarding the dissemination of VV&C
results to both the NATO community and the larger R&D community. From a NATO
perspective, the use of a lecture series and/or workshop would help to disseminate results and
help to transfer knowledge of verification, validation and certification of embedded systems.
Furthermore, the RTG observed during its deliberations that there were difficulties in interacting
with the operational side of NATO, yet the interaction between operations and R&D is
important for both communities. The R&D community will find out what are the specific pain
points being faced by operational staff; the operational staff will learn what new capabilities
may make some portions of their tasks simpler. Consequently, a workshop format through
which R&D and operational representatives could interact could be an important feature in
ameliorating the above difficulties. Finally, it is the intention of the authors of this report to
write a synopsis of this report and submit the synopsis for publication in a widely disseminated
journal.
2. Dual Use of High Assurance Technologies
The primary recommendation arising from the research task groups deliberations was the
recommendation for a new task group entitled Dual Use of High Assurance Technology. This
new Task Group has been approved and is identified as IST-048/RTG-020. The intent of the
new RTG is as follows:
High Assurance Technologies (such as formal methods) have normally been used to
develop systems requiring high degrees of assurance as to functionality, safety and
security. One of the key benefits of such technologies is their ability to ferret out subtle
problems with system requirements, design and implementation.
However, experience has also been obtained in which such technologies can be used to
identify exploitable weaknesses in systems potentially being used by adversaries.  From a
formal methods perspective, the phrase "formal methods-based tiger teaming" is meant to
capture the idea of using formal methods to help drive the identification of flaws in such
systems. The interaction of mathematical modeling with experimental testing of such
systems has been shown to be very effective, but not widely known, in identifying
exploitable flaws.
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In effect, there is a duality between all assurance technologies and offensive measures.
Knowledge from assurance can be used in (1) deciding on the type of attack, and (2) where
to attack.  For example, Byzantine proofs assume synchrony so attacks could be based on
falsifying the assumption. Nuclear protection static analysis does not deal properly with
concurrency, so one should attack the concurrency basis.  Safety cases reveal
preoccupations and guide one to areas not normally considered.
The specific objectives of the RTG are:
The Task Group will review and evaluate techniques currently used for high assurance, general
V&V activities, and information warfare. Based on the review and evaluation, the Task Group
will develop (possibly meta-level) processes for effectively identifying exploitable weakness in
critical infrastructure. These processes will be based on a fusion of the most effective techniques
found in high assurance, V&V and information warfare activities. This activity will be a joint
research effort of the participating nations.
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Appendices
A Terms of Reference
I. ORIGIN
Background
In September 1996, the Flight Vehicle Integration Panel made a proposal to form a Working
Group that was approved by RTB in March 1997 under the same title. This group never started
due to some difficulties to meet the experts from the appropriate organisms. In addition, RTO
was restructured within the same period. The new SCI Panel received the legacy of this activity
and decided at its 1998 Fall Business Meeting to ask IST Panel if this activity could be
transferred under the IST panel auspices.
The idea for a Task Group has been discussed both in IST Panel meetings and via e-mail. In a
discussion at its Fall 1999 meeting, a sufficient number of Panel Members supported the
formation of a Task Group on the subject for more detailed and substantial work. Embedded
systems are ubiquitous in military systems as well as in commercial products used in military
applications. From tactical radios to range finders to avionics control units, the Battlespace is
filled with digital devices that rely on embedded software for proper operation and functionality.
For life-critical and mission-critical systems, extensive testing is required; yet the size and scope
of embedded software in todays products precludes exhaustive testing.
Justification (Relevance to NATO)
Some testing techniques, such as modified condition/decision coverage (MC/DC), have been
adopted by government agencies as required methods. Yet there is no body of knowledge that
characterizes the types of faults typically found by the various methods and which types of
faults might remain undetected. Furthermore, performance testing and stress/load testing are
oftentimes overlooked until the product is fielded. Thus, verification and validation are critical
efforts for embedded systems. Furthermore, the recent Y2K exercises demonstrated the
difficulties many vendors experienced in certifying software. Those Y2K issues related strictly
to date and time and yet were quite costly. Expanding the scope to include proper functionality
under planned and unplanned usage is important, especially for safety-critical systems; cost-
effective and timely methods are needed for certification.
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II. OBJECTIVES
Aim
The aim of the Task Group on Validation, Verification, and Certification of Embedded
Systems is to consider better techniques to validate and verify embedded systems. In classic
terminology, these two issues are:
Are we solving the correct problem? and
Are we solving it correctly?
Beyond the issues of verification and validation, there is the question of the basis on which
these two aspects are judged. Is there a means to certify that systems meet their intended
requirement specifications? This is of critical importance since many embedded systems are
mission-critical and life-critical applications.
Specific Goals
The Task Group will evaluate new testing techniques, partial or complete verification
techniques, and certification techniques for correctness as well as better means of requirements
specification and traceability in order to validate, verify, and certify the reliability of embedded
systems. The following topics will be considered:
- Verification, including
- Formal methods of correctness
- Applications of model checking and theorem proving
- Validation, including requirements traceability
- Certification, including probabilistic measures of effectiveness (MoE) of survivability in the
presence of system faults as well as intrusions or attacks
- Survivability and/or graceful degradation and/or anomaly management
- Cost and performance estimation of embedded systems, where performance includes both
speed of execution and reliability
- Automated techniques for requirements traceability
- Techniques for testing stress and overload conditions
- Design techniques for test and recovery
- Interface testing techniques for embedded systems which could include both specialized and
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components
Expected Deliverables and/or End products
The proposed Task Group is to review the techniques currently used in the software industry to
product high quality products; an appropriate number of methods and software life-cycle metrics
for systems of relevant complexity should also be examined, particularly those which are supported
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by fully operational environments. At the conclusion of this activity, the Task Group should deliver
a report addressing the following topics:
Assessment of current technical capabilities and relevance of these techniques and methods to
embedded military systems
Assessment of relative strengths and limitations of these methods
Assessment of current research trends in testing, formal methods, and requirements traceability
Specific recommendations for military application of these techniques
Recommendation for future NATO IST efforts, if relevant, such as Symposium or Workshop.
Duration
Three years from approval by RTB
III. RESOURCES
Membership
Invited experts nominated by participating nations should include government, industry, and
academic participants working in relevant areas.
Recommended Technical Team Leader: Initially, Dr. Ann MILLER (US)
Recommended Lead Nation: United States
NATIONS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE : BE, CA, CZ, FR, NL, PO, US.
National and/or NATO resources needed
Some consulting support, as determined by first Task Group meeting,
Symposiums' support if that is the proposed recommendation.
No special needs are foreseen except for Internet access.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL
Both Activity and publications will be NATO Unclassified
PARTICIPATION BY PARTNERS NATIONS
This Task Group will welcome Partners' participation
LIAISON
Other NATO Panels will be invited to send representatives if desired.
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ACTIVITY Task Group (RTG) 03 / 2000
Activity REF. Number IST-027 / RTG-009
Validation, Verification and Certification
Of Embedded Systems 01 / 2001
PRINCIPAL MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 1 2 3 4 NU 12 / 2003
MILITARY FUNCTIONS 1 2 3 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
PANEL AND COORDINATION IST (Information Systems Technology)
LOCATION AND DATES Various participating NATO countries P-I
PUBLICATION DATA Technical Report (TR) Fall 2003 150 / 180 NU
KEYWORDS Validation Verification Certification Performance
Embedded Systems and Software Trustworthiness Reliability Real-Time
I. BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION (Relevance to NATO)
Embedded systems are ubiquitous in military systems as well as in Commercial Off The Shelf
(COTS) products used in military applications. From tactical radios to range finders to avionics
control units, the battlespace is filled with digital devices that rely on embedded software for
proper operation and functionality. For life-critical and mission-critical systems, extensive
testing is required; yet the size and scope of embedded software in todays products precludes
exhaustive testing. There is no body of knowledge that characterizes the types of faults typically
found by the various methods and which types of faults might remain undetected. Furthermore,
performance testing and stress/load testing are oftentimes overlooked until the product is
fielded. Two fundamental issues are (i) Are we solving the correct problem? and (ii) Are we
solving the problem correctly? Beyond the issues of verification and validation, there is the
issue of certification, especially for mission-critical and life-critical embedded systems. Thus,
verification and validation (V&V) are crucial development tasks for embedded systems.
Typically, military systems devote significantly less development time for V&V compared to
commercial systems.  Effective strategic and tactical methods for Validation, Verification, and
Certification (VV&C) of embedded military systems are needed.
II. OBJECTIVES
The aims of the Task Group on Validation, Verification, and Certification of Embedded
Systems are: (i) to compile and critique existing and emerging techniques to validate and
verify embedded systems, (ii) to provide recommendations for potential NATO adoption, and
(iii) to review the applicability of civil and military certification standards and their effects on
validation and verification of NATO systems.
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III. TOPICS TO BE COVERED
The following topics will be considered as a part of the task groups VV&C of embedded
systems:
AdoptionAdoption models/impact on emerging technologies
CertificationAnalysis of existing and emerging standards (FAA 178B/US and GAMT
17/France)
Classification of Embedded Systems Time triggered architectures (for instance)
Design for non-functional requirements Validation, verification, traceability, etc.
Estimation Cost and performance estimation of systems, performance including both speed
of execution and reliability
Measures Measures of effectiveness (MoE) that can be used to evaluate the operational
impact and efficacy of techniques
Process Techniques for requirements elicitation, capture and specification
Effect of specific techniques to the certification process
Validation Techniques for testing stress and overload conditions
Interface testing techniques for systems which could include both specialized
and COTS components
Role of testing techniques in certification
Verification Specification, analysis, proof
Role of verification techniques in certification
IV DELIVERABLE AND/OR END PRODUCT
At the conclusion of this activity, the Task Group should deliver a Final Report addressing the
following topics:
(i) to compile and critique existing and emerging techniques to validate and verify embedded
systems,
(ii) to provide recommendations for potential NATO adoption., and
(iii) to review the applicability of civil and military certification standards and their effects on
validation and verification of NATO systems.
In addition a website containing relevant materials pertaining to the VV&C of embedded systems
will be developed.
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V. TECHNICAL TEAM LEADER AND LEAD NATION
Recommended Team Leader: Prof. Ann MILLER (US)
Recommended Lead Nation : United States
VI NATIONS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE: BE, CA, CZ, FR, NL, PL, PO, US.
VII NATIONAL AND/OR NATO RESOURCES NEEDED
The RTG is expected to deliberate on the specific topics given above, over the Internet, in 1-2
day meetings to be held 2-3 times a year and, possibly, in a workshop.
VIII RTA RESOURCES NEEDED
Consultants will be asked upon request.
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C Programme of Work
This Programme of Work describes the manner in which the Task Group RTG-009 shall carry
out its activities as identified in the Terms of Reference (TOR).
The aim of the Task Group on Validation, Verification, and Certification (VV&C) of
Embedded Systems is to evaluate techniques to validate and verify embedded systems
software. Beyond the issues of verification and validation, are methods to certify software
relative to the environment within which the software reside. These activities are of critical
importance since many embedded systems are mission-critical and/or life-critical applications.
The following topics will be considered as a part of the task groups evaluation of techniques
for the VV&C of embedded systems software:
Adoption Adoption models/impact on emerging technologies.
Certification Analysis of existing and emerging standards (FAA 178B/US
and GAMT 17/France).
Classification of Embedded
Systems
Time triggered architectures (for instance).
Design for non-functional
requirements
Validation, verification, traceability, etc.
Estimation Cost and performance estimation of systems, performance
including both speed of execution and reliability.
Measures Measures of effectiveness (MoE) that can be used to evaluate
the operational impact and efficacy of techniques.
Process Techniques for requirements elicitation, capture and
specification.
Effect of specific techniques to the certification process.
Validation Techniques for testing stress and overload conditions.
Interface testing techniques for systems that could include
both specialized and COTS components.
Role of testing techniques in certification.
Verification Specification, analysis, proof.
Role of verification techniques in certification.
At the conclusion of this activity, the Task Group shall deliver a final report addressing the
following topics:
1. Assessment of current technical capabilities and relevance of these techniques and methods to
embedded military systems.
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2. Assessment of relative strengths and limitations of these methods.
3. Assessment of current research trends of these methods.
4. Specific recommendations for military application of these techniques
5. Recommendation for future NATO IST efforts, if relevant, such as Symposium or Workshop.
The nations that have agreed to participate are Belgium, Canada, The Czech Republic, France,
Georgia, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and the U.S. This Task Group welcomes
the participation of all NATO Nations and Partners for Peace nations. The list of names and
contact information for RTG-009 participants is attached.
RTG-009 is expected to deliberate on the specific topics given above, over the Internet, in 1-2
day meetings to be held 2-3 times a year and, possibly, in a workshop. Some support from RTA
for consulting shall be requested. Workshop or symposium support shall be requested, if that is
the proposed recommendation.  Otherwise, no special needs are foreseen except for Internet
access.
RTG-009 shall use appropriate NATO/RTA standards for documentation.
RTG-009 milestones and deliverables are summarized in the following table. Further milestones
and deliverables will be added as required.
Date Milestone Deliverables
March 2001 RTG-009 formed Minutes
Revised TAP
Pertinent DCI list
May 2001 2nd RTG-009 Meeting Minutes
Revised ToR
PoW
May 2001 Partners for Peace Meeting Presentation on RTG-009 status
June 2001 IST Panel Meeting Presentation to IST Panel on RTG-009 status
October 2001 3rd RTG-009 Meeting
(including Preliminary
Workshop)
Minutes
Workshop presentations
Final Report Outline
Web site structure
Identification of FY2002 activities
December 2001 Annual report
Spring 2002 4th RTG-009 Meeting T.B.A.
December 2002 Annual report
December 2003 Annual report
March 2004 Workshop, if proposed
March 2004 Final Report
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The October, 2001 RTG-009 meeting will consist of a Preliminary Workshop (with 3-5
presentations including Cazin on the state of the practice of safety/security partitioning and
Voas on the state of the research on intrusion tolerance. The Preliminary Workshop will be
followed by an RTG-009 business meeting.
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D Participants
The following table identifies the members of the research task group. The following members
were particularly active and have played a material role in the development of this report: Robin
Bloomfield, Jacques Cazin, Dan Craigen, Natalia Juristo, Ernst Kesseler and Jeff Voas.
'*' means principal member.
Task Group Chairman
CANADA
*Mr. Dan CRAIGEN
ORA Canada
27-2000 Thurston Drive.
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CANADA
e-mail : dan@ora.on.ca
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Fax : +1 (613) 241 8704
Task Group Members
CZECH REPUBLIC
Dip. Eng. Radek ORSAK
Air Force Research Institute Prague
VTUL a PVO Praha
tr. kpt. Jarose, 27
602 00 BRNO
CZECH REPUBLIC
e-mail : radek.orsak@vtul.cz
Tel : +420 (5) 41.18.24.50.
Fax : +420 (5) 45.24.61.80.
FRANCE
Mr. Jacques CAZIN
ONERA/DTIM
2, Av Edouard Belin B.P 4025
TOULOUSE, CEDEX 3
FRANCE
e-mail : jacques.cazin@cert.fr
Tel : +33 (0) 5.62.25.25.90 31055
Fax : +33 (0) 5.62.25.25.93
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GEORGIA
Vice-Col Shota GELENIDZE
Deputy Head, Central Board of Strategy
Planning and Scientific-Technical
Researches
Moscow avenue, 7/1
380020 TBILISSI
GEORGIA
e-mail : ist_georto@yahoo.co.uk
Tel : +995 (32) 92.37.79.
Fax : +995 (32) 95.69.49.
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Maj. Andrzej STASIAK
Faculty of Cybernetics
Military University of Technology
Kaliskiego 2
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POLAND
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INESC (Instituto de Engenharia e
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Rua Alves Redol, 9
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Tel : +351 (21) 310.02.63.
Fax : +351 (21) 314.58.43.
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-74-
NLR-TP-2004-256
SPAIN
Dr. Natalia JURISTO
Facultad de Informática
Universidad Politecnica de Madrid
Campus de Montegancedo
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E Combating Terrorism Recommendations
During the period of the RTGs deliberations, the group was asked to recommend courses of
action in support of combating terrorism. The group identified the following four
recommendations based on their experience and technical backgrounds. The first
recommendation (Dual Use of High Assurance Technologies) was approved as a follow on
activity for the current RTG.
Dual Use of High Assurance Technologies
High Assurance Technologies (such as formal methods) have normally been used to develop
systems requiring high degrees of assurance as to functionality, safety and security. One of the
key benefits of such technologies is their ability to ferret out subtle problems with system
requirements, design and implementation.
However, experience has also been obtained in which such technologies can be used to identify
exploitable weaknesses in systems potentially being used by adversaries.  From a formal
methods perspective, the phrase "formal methods-based tiger teaming" is meant to capture the
idea of using formal methods to help drive the identification of flaws in such systems. The
interaction of mathematical modeling with experimental testing of such systems has been shown
to be very effective, but not widely known, in identifying exploitable flaws.
In effect, there is a duality between all assurance technologies and offensive measures.
Knowledge from assurance can be used in (1) deciding on the type of attack, and (2) where to
attack.  For example, Byzantine proofs assume synchrony so attacks could be based on
falsifying the assumption. Nuclear protection static analysis does not deal properly with
concurrency, so one should attack the concurrency basis.  Safety cases reveal preoccupations
and guide one to areas not normally considered.
Economic and Technical Trade-offs of the non-functional
Attributes of Systems
The grand challenge facing the software quality research community is the ability to accurately
define, in the very earliest stages of development, the techniques that will be need to achieve the
needed levels of the various non-functional attributes (a.k.a. the "ilities"): reliability,
availability, fault tolerance, testability, maintainability, performance, software safety, software
security, etc.  Note, however, that there are associated technical and economic trade-offs that
must be made in order to achieve quality, and also to certify software quality. To satisfy a
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particular level of each attribute requires specific cost expenditures, and some of these attributes
conflict with each other.  Therefore to gain confidence that the likelihood that cyberterrorism
will be unsuccessful requires some way to balance the economic and technical tradeoffs among
the software "ilities".  This is an open research question that to date has not been adequately
addressed by the software engineering research community.
Mitigating Attacks on Embedded Systems
Embedded systems are evolving towards becoming ubiquitous and network (I.P.) enabled. The
resulting open nature of such systems is vastly different from the current preponderance of
embedded systems where access is tightly controlled and, often, physically isolated from non-
relevant systems.
The evolving open nature of embedded systems significantly changes the threat landscape for
such systems. Embedded systems designers must be aware of the new landscape and
apply/develop technologies to mitigate attacks arising from the new opportunities available to
our adversaries. One possible attack, for example, would be a denial of service attack on a hard
real time embedded system.
Software security classification (and enforcement)
Observation: for embedded software safety and security are characteristics which share
similarities. Consequently an approach for security could benefit from the substantial work on
safety.
The various software safety standards  (e.g. DO-178B, DO-278, IEC61508 and its derivatives
for railways etc) all consider the various  (software) functions of a system. A safety (or risk)
assessment then provides the basis for a qualification of the various functions to the defined
safety levels. Subsequently for each safety level, development standards of various rigors are
prescribed. The most safety critical levels mandate very rigorous software development and
verification methods. Measures have to be taken to prevent unintended interference in case
software classified at several levels has to execute on one shared platform.
The suggestion is that similarly for security issues the functions or features of an embedded
system are also to be classified. Using a partitioning scheme, it can be ensured that the most
important functions have a high probability of remaining fully functional whereas nice to have
options might succumb to attacks. Such partitioning software of course has to be of the highest
or most reliable level itself. For these  "core" functions rigorous methods like formal methods,
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extensive verification etc can be applied to assure they will be functioning as required.  Usually
the most important functions are small compared to the total set of requirements so it becomes
more affordable to apply the rigorous development methods (or conversely the available effort
can be allocated to the most critical functions). Standardized levels provide a uniform
(internationally recognized) measure of how much the function can be trusted to function
correctly.
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F Software Certification Agencies and Services Offered
There are a number of organizations that are active in a variety of different types of software
certification68
• TUVs
• National Laboratories
• Open Group
• Factory Mutual
• Microsoft
• CASS
In the UK the National Physical Laboratory provides services in assessing several kinds of
software. These include compilers, OSI communication stacks, and numerical software. Other
National Laboratories such as TNO in the Netherlands have similar roles.
Factory Mutual is a major US based insurance organization It manages a not-for-profit
organization Factory Mutual Research (FMR) which has a wide-ranging programme of safety
assessment. Although originally based in the USA, FMR have recently become active in
Europe, and have formed alliances with TÜV Product Service and TÜV Rheinland. They have a
programme of functional and product safety assessment.
Microsoft identified that a major source of Windows problems was due to third party software,
especially driver software, causing problems with memory corruption. They initiated a
programme on driver verification with an associated driver certification scheme. Note that this
does not verify that the driver is fit-for-purpose only that it does not threaten the system
software that it works with.
The CASS scheme is an initiative to support the certification of safety-related systems against
IEC 61508 [RD 1]. Although a UK scheme, the first certification organization to be accredited
under CASS is claiming significant international interest.
                                                     
68 This section is summarized from an Adelard ESA/Astrium study.
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G Mapping techniques to properties and attributes
Definition of properties
There are a variety of ways in which the desired properties of a system can be classified. Indeed
there has been considerable work in trying o define the dependability terminology. Here we take
a practical set of attributes from the draft air traffic regulation in the UK CAP670 SW01.
• Functional properties: The primary functional behaviour of the software
• Timing properties: The time allowed for the software to respond to given inputs or to
periodic events, and/or the performance of the software in terms of transactions or messages
handled per unit time.
• Robustness: The behaviour of the software in the event of spurious (unexpected) inputs,
hardware faults and power supply interruptions, either in the computer system itself or in
connected devices.
• Reliability: The probability that the software will perform to a specified requirement for a
specified period of time under specified conditions.
• Accuracy: The required precision of the computed results.
• Resource usage: The amount of resources within the computer system that can be used by
the application software.
• Overload tolerance: The behaviour of the system in the event of, and in particular its
tolerance to, inputs occurring at a greater rate than expected during normal operation of the
system.
Bibliography techniques
2. SAFETY ANALYSIS
2.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (SYS)
2.2 HAZOP
Fault propagation analysis
2.3 Cause Consequence Diagrams/Event-Tree Analysis
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2.4 FMEA/FMECA/Fault Tree Analysis
2.5 Hardware/Software Interaction Analysis
3. FAULT AVOIDANCE
Organizational methods
3.1. ISVV
3.2. Independent Safety Assessment
3.3. Metrics for process
3.4. Metrics for product
3.5. Maturity assessment
3.6. Traceability analysis
3.7 Procurement policy
Design techniques
3.8. Application-oriented Languages
3.9. Formal Analysis
3.10. Formal Specification
3.11. Formal Development
3.12. Simulation of human operations
3.13. Modeling (SDL, Petri)
3.14. Safe Language Subsets /Strongly Typed Programming Language
4. FAULT DETECTION
Testing
4.1. Structural /Functional /Requirement based /Stress testing
4.2. Regression testing
4.3. Fault Injection
Other techniques
4.4. Inspections and Walkthroughs
4.5. Static analysis  control and data flow
4.6. Schedulability analysis / Worst case analysis
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5. FAILURE DETECTION
Control Flow Monitoring
5.1. Watchdog
5.2. Dynamic logic
5.3. Signature analysis / Memorized executed cases
5.4. Exception handling
5.5. Run time anomalies detection
Data Monitoring
5.6. Assertions / Plausibility checks
5.7. Integrity checks / Detection codes
5.8. Defensive programming
6. FAILURE CONTAINMENT
Fail Safe
6.1. Wrapping
6.2. Safety supervision
6.3. Manual Override
Fault Tolerance
6.4. N-version Programming
6.5. Recovery blocks
7. MONITORING AND FEEDBACK
7.1. Event recorders
7.2. Internal error and status recording
7.3. Fault reporting
7.4. Incident reporting
7.5. Accident analysis
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Attribute technique mapping (partial)69
Techniques/object (IWA) contractual boundary
Requirements    Specification Design            Code        
Functional properties
 
Review
Traceability
Animation,
prototyping
7*1;
Review
Traceability
Animation
3.8; 3.10; 3.11;
Review
Traceability
3.8; 3.11; 4.4; 5.1;
5.2; 5.3**; 5.4**;
5.6-5.7**
Review
Acceptance tests
3.11; 4.1; 4.4; 5.2;
5.4**;
Interoperability
(close to non-
interference, fault
propagation - but of
interfaces)
Composability via
formal notations?
Use of standards,
orbs (object request
brokers)
2.2;
Composability via
formal notations?
2.3;
Interface testing
non-interference
(of features and
intended functions; of
other "unused"
features)
2.2;
Partitioning
Proof
Fault/failures
propagation
Covert channel
analysis
6.1; 2.3;
 
Partitioning
Covert channel
analysis
Fault/failures
propagation - flow
based tools;
guideword methods
2.3; 4.4;
 
Static analysis -
information flow,
pointer analysis
Tests - fault
injection to look
at fault
propagation
Covert channel
analysis
2.3; 4.4; 4.5;
Timing properties
Review
Simulation
Schedulability
analysis
3.13;
Timed Petrie nets
WCET
Design review
looking at mismatch
between architecture
and requirements
Schedulability
analysis
4.6;
3.13;
WCET
Timing tests
Schedulability
analysis
4.1; 4.6
                                                     
69 This table is taken from IPFI10.4, CAA regulation.
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Correctness
(could check
correctness wrt to
system requirements)
Review wrt
requirements
Review wrt
specification
Refinement proof
Review
Refinement proof
Testing
3.14; 4.1;
 
Absence of faults
(specific classes)
Inconsistency,
incomplete -
Animation,
prototyping
 
Inconsistency -
Language subsets
Code generation
Design review
looking at mismatch
between architecture
and requirements
3.14;
Code analysis (for
certain fault
classes)
Buffer overflow -
code scanning
Symbolic
execution (array
bounds, divide by
zero)
3.14; 4.5;
Reliability,
availability
Field experience
Process
Process profiling
Field experience
Process
Process profiling
6.4-6.5
Project specific
metrics
Process profiling
5.1; 5.2; 6.4-6.5;
Statistical testing
Project specific
metrics (N/T)
Process profiling
4.1; 5.2;
Accuracy
Review
Simulation
Numerical analysis
Simulation
Numerical analysis
Acceptance
testing
4.1;
Resource usage
Review
Simulation
Performance analysis
(architecture)
Performance
analysis
(architecture)
Performance
analysis
Integrity checks
(locking, stack,
pointer access..)
4.1;
 
Robustness
(all interfaces; internal,
external, human)
Review
Simulation
2.2;
Analysis for
independence;
diversity redundancy
Single failure
criterion
2.3;
Analysis for
independence;
diversity
redundancy
Single failure
criterion
2.3;  5.8;
Fault injection
Stress testing
2.3; 4.3; 5.8;
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Overload tolerance
(linked to timeliness)
Review
Simulation
Review h/w; s/w
issues
Identify worst cases
Simulate design
Identify coping
strategies;
degradation
Schedulability
analysis
Identify worst cases
Schedulability
analysis
 
Stress testing
Schedulability
analysis
4.1; 4.3;
 
Maintainability
(see non-interference)
Review Review Review
Review
4.2;
Modifiability
Review; definition of
environment; types
of change
Modularity
Tests for coupling;
cohesion
Trial
4.2;
Usability
Task Analysis
Prototype trials
Good practice?
3.12;
Task Analysis
Prototype trials
Thea
3.12;
Thea, model
checking procedures
Trials
mis-use testing
(could be robustness to
user)
Experience,
ethnography, trials to
identify
"Hazard"
identification
techniques
Attack trees
Tiger teaming
Formal methods
based attacks
Tiger teaming
 
Formal methods
based attacks
Tiger teaming
 
Formal methods
based attacks
Tiger teaming
4.1; 4.3;
 
Safety 2.1 ; 2.2; 6.2; 6.3; 6.2; 4.3;
Security
Implement patches
(req on process;
product)
Define security
policies; vertical
domain
standards(constraints
on dev. processes and
constrains on
Testing for
patches updates
4.1;
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components that are
selected); look at
intrusion detection
and tolerance
schemes; patch
management
Confidentiality
Requirements often
via standards or
legislation (hippa -
medical US)
 
or users
Passwords, bio-
metrics PKI ....
Integrity (data,
information)
Review design for
techniques.
Specification via
security policy
encryption,
Availability
Insider attacks,
malicious code (see
authentication to
restrict access)
Scanning binaries
